The Co-Production of Technoscience and Social Science in Green Revolution Mexico, 1956-1979 by Vieth, Paul








THE CO-PRODUCTION OF TECHNOSCIENCE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE IN GREEN 






SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE COLLEGE 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
Degree of 











THE CO-PRODUCTION OF TECHNOSCIENCE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE IN GREEN 
REVOLUTION MEXICO, 1956-1979 
 
 
A THESIS APPROVED BY THE  



























          
 ________________________ 



























































I want to thank my parents, Donna and Paul, and Jordan for all their love, support, 
and, especially, patience. I want to thank my committee members, Peter Soppelsa, 
Ph.D. and Gabriela Rios, Ph.D., for their time, consideration, and, especially, patience. 
And I want to thank my advisor, Katherine Pandora, Ph.D., for her mentorship, faith, 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Acknowledgements ……………………………………………………………………………………………. iv 
List of Figures ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. vi 
Abstract …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… vii 
Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 1 
Selected Historiography of the Sociology of Dominant and Subaltern Knowledges …… 4 
Methodology from the Sociology of Technoscientific Knowledge …………………………… 10 
Historical Background and Analysis of Green Revolution Stakeholders ………………….. 14 
The Co-production of the Green Revolution and American Cold War Objectives:     
Pseudo-territorialization of a Liberal-Democratic Capitalist Sphere of 
Influence ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 14 
The Co-Production of the Green Revolution and Mexican Cold War Objectives: 
National Identity Formation and Modernization ……………………………………….. 17 
The Green Revolution Itself …………………………………………………………………….. 19 
The Anthropological Debate on Essential “Peasantness” ………………………………………. 20 
Interpretations of the Green Revolution in Mexico: Economics and Diffusion 
Theory ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 28 
Economic and Econometric Case Studies ……………………………………………………………. 38 
Ethnographic Field Studies ………………………………………………………………………………… 51 
Interpretations of the Green Revolution in Mexico: Anthropology …………………………. 74 
Conclusions/Extensions ……………………………………………………………………………………. 84 
Epilogue ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 88 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Subroutine INCQF ………………………………………………………………………………. 60 





In 1943 the Rockefeller Foundation, nominally in partnership with the Mexican 
government, initiated its Mexican Agriculture Program (MAP). Over the subsequent 
decades, a complex network of worldwide inter-governmental/NGO relationships was 
formalized along the model developed in Mexico. The dissemination of this research-
educational model of agronomic “rationalization” to much of the Global South became 
retroactively known as the “Green Revolution.” This paper argues that this imposition 
of “rational” agronomy and agricultural economics through mechanization, 
monoculture, and synthetic inputs is constitutive of “epistemic colonialism.” Despite 
the attention paid to the Green Revolution as an agronomic undertaking, using 
economics and anthropology case studies (1965-1979), this thesis argues that the Green 
Revolution was a both a technoscientific intervention and a social scientific 
intervention in indigenous Mexican agricultural knowledge making that combined to 
form a development regime. This co-produced development regime was embedded in a 
hierarchical set of nested co-productive relationships with Mexico’s desire to 
modernize through urbanization and national identity formation and with the United 
States’ Cold War geo-political strategy of pseudo-territorialization for the creation of a 




Vandana Shiva uses the metaphor of the “monoculture of the mind” to create an 
illustrative parallel between the losses of both epistemic plurality and biological 
diversity. In her 1993 Monocultures of the Mind she crafted that ecofeminist metaphor 
for both activist and scholarly purposes. Much of Monocultures of the Mind is 
grounded in historical events and has been widely circulated with acclaim among those 
operating in Science and Technology Studies (STS), but it is not formally a disciplinary 
history of science and technology.1 In a fashion less literary than Shiva, this thesis 
depicts an historical period between 1943 and 1979 in which mental monocultivation, 
in this case the supplanting of indigenous Mexican epistemologies by the Northern 
technoscientific episteme, and botanical monocultivation are packaged together.2 This 
particular packaging, to history, is called the Green Revolution, although that reference 
must be used in full acknowledgement of the scientific triumphalism that it was 
originally coined to herald in 1968 by William S. Gaud, then director of the U.S. Agency 
for International Development. Despite its drawbacks, “Green Revolution” at least has 
                                                          
1 In this thesis I will use Northern rather than Western, “developed,” or “industrialized” because 
it is currently considered to be the least value-laden. Northern refers to the Global North, 
considered in Global and International Studies to represent continental North America north of 
the U.S.-Mexico border, Europe (including Russia and Turkey), Japan, Australia, New Zealand, 
and occasionally South Korea and Kazakhstan. 
2 I do not see any internally-consistent rationale to make a categorical distinction between 
science and technology. That categorical distinction, characterizing technology as the practical 
application of theoretical science, reifies the dichotomy of mind and body in the Northern 
episteme, and is usually employed, again as boundary work, to subordinate technical thinking to 
epistemic thinking. For the marginalization of empirical techne (what Marglin calls labor’s 
knowledge) by positivist episteme in the history of Northern knowledge making see: Stephen 
Marglin, “Towards the Decolonization of the Mind,” in Dominating Knowledge: Development, 
Culture, and Resistance, eds. Frederique Apffel Marglin and Stephen Marglin (Oxford: Oxford 
UP, 1990), 24-25. 
     Indigenous here used indiscriminately sometimes to refer to native peoples of Mexico and 
sometimes to all Mexicans. With native peoples of Mexico, they are indigenous relative to 
culturally-european mestizo and european population, with Mexicans, they are indigenous to 
Mexico from the perspective of Americans. This indiscriminate labelling is one of the obvious 




fewer syllables than “The Second or Third Agricultural Revolution.”3 In either case, its 
grandiosity and impact are fully represented. Also for its grandness and impact, the 
Green Revolution has been thoroughly studied by historians of science and technology. 
For that reason, this thesis does not attempt to replicate the histories of science and 
technology that have so admirably studied the plant pathologists, entomologists, 
geneticists, soil scientists, and others working to deliver the technoscientific package of 
hybrid seeds, fertilizers, biocides, and machinery to Mexican farmers.4 Instead, I focus 
on the role development-oriented and -critical economists and anthropologists played 
in the Green Revolution intervention in Mexico. I argue that the work of social-
scientists in Mexico in the 1960s and 1970s constituted a social-scientific intervention 
in Mexican agricultural knowledge-making; that this social-scientific intervention in 
conjunction with the technoscientific agronomic intervention co-produced a 
development regime; and that this regime should be regarded by historians as a case of 
epistemic colonialism. 
 When the Green Revolution was initiated in Mexico in 1943, the virtue of the 
proposed epistemic monoculture was nearly unquestioned in Northern international 
policy academic circles. They insisted upon the inexorable universality of reductive 
mechanistic thinking (and its method) under the rubric of modernization theory, the 
belief that the mental monoculture of Northern technoscience should be transplanted 
to other knowledge ecosystems. By the late 1970s, however, scholars both North and 
South were questioning not only specific applications of modernization theory in the 
South, such as development regimes like the Green Revolution, but the inherent 
                                                          
3 For the curious: The first agricultural revolution was the shift from foraging and/or 
pastoralism to sedentary cultivation; the second, depending on categories disputed by historians 
of agriculture, either refers to the Green Revolution or one of several significant developments 
anywhere from the early medieval period (in the Arab world), or the high Middle Ages in 
Europe, to 19th-century Britain, indicating various combinations of changes in field rotation, 
plowing technology, and irrigation. 
4 “Biocide” is shorthand for pesticide/insecticide, herbicide, and fungicide. 
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validity of “modernization” theory and its attendant nexus of liberal democratic 
government, rationalized bureaucracy, technoscientific industry and agriculture, and 
global commercial capitalism. Some of those critics began to recover and articulate-
anew alternative epistemologies marginalized or rendered invisible altogether by the 
expansion of the Northern episteme that began with 15th century colonization, of which 
the Green Revolution was an extension. These alternative epistemologies can be 
considered under the heading coined by Boaventura de Sousa Santos, the Portuguese 
sociologist of law and economist: “epistemologies of the South.”5 
This thesis also argues, then, that the Green Revolution, despite the excitement 
of science triumphalists about hybrid seeds, exponential yield increases, and the 
salvation of the pitiful masses from starvation, was in its essence, in both its theoretical 
premises and controversial outcomes, a social scientific phenomenon. This thesis 
argues that the lifecycle of the Green Revolution, and by consequence that of 
modernization theory of which it was the exemplar, can be most clearly traced through 
the social science literature from 1965 to 1979. At the beginning of this period social 
scientists were uncritically using the Green Revolution as a test case in modernization 
theory and optimizing it for export to any Southern nation that would co-sponsor it. In 
the early 1970s social scientists began to address the by then undeniable socioeconomic 
and ecological shortcomings of the Green Revolution by questioning the neutrality of 
its technologies and reassessing its implementation. By the end of the 1970s, social 
                                                          
5 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide (New 
York: Routledge, 2016). These alternative epistemologies, in recent literature, have also come to 
include what might be called “folk” knowledges from the North, long coevolving with the now 
dominant technoscientific episteme and slowly marginalized inversely with, and through 
boundary work by, the ascendancy of the technoscientific episteme. One such alternative 
knowledge system indigenous to the North is described by Stephen Marglin as techne — a 
decentralized empirical way of knowing cultivated by agriculturalists and craftspeople. Stephen 
Marglin, “Farmers, Seedsmen, and Scientists: Systems of Agriculture and Systems of 
Knowledge,” in Decolonizing Knowledge: From Development to Dialogue, eds. Frederique 
Apffel-Marglin & Stephen Marglin (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996). 
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scientists had begun, through their studies of the Green Revolution, to question 
modernization theory itself and its assumptions about time, labor, and value. Their 
Green Revolution studies also led them to question the universality of the Northern 
episteme’s mechanistic and reductive causality. 
Selected Historiography of the Sociology of Dominant and Subaltern 
Knowledges 
The Green Revolution was both an extension of the old colonial project to 
expand the Northern episteme dating back to Spanish Catholic missions and schools in 
Mexico and, particularly to its time period, a hallmark instantiation of the Cold War 
neocolonial project of modernization theory. This thesis attempts to understand the 
Green Revolution through its transition in the opinions of social scientists during the 
late 1960s and 1970s from paragon of American international modernization theory to 
modernization-theory-crisis ground-zero. In the twenty-first century modernization 
theory is still being enacted under various pseudonyms by proponents of Northern-
style (agro-)industrial development and so, consequently, philosophers, sociologists, 
and public intellectuals continue to challenge the intellectual and historical foundations 
of the expansion of the Northern episteme. One form these challenges take is the 
reaffirmation of non-Northern ways of knowing. 
One such epistemology of the South, put forward by De Sousa Santos, Joao 
Arriscado Nunes, and Maria Paula Meneses (the latter colleagues of De Sousa Santos at 
the University of Coimbra, a sociologist and an anthropologist, respectively) calls for an 
“ecology of knowledges” to replace “the monoculture of scientific knowledge” in 
“Opening Up the Canon of Knowledge and Recognition of Difference,” the introduction 
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to an edited volume entitled Another Knowledge is Possible.6 This ecology of 
knowledges represented in the anthology consists both of Southern epistemologies 
external to “science” (previously considered invalid for their “superstition” and 
“traditionalism”) and of the “internal plurality of science” established by feminist and 
post-colonial scholars and by historians, sociologists, and philosophers of science and 
technology. This internal plurality of science, for de Sousa Santos, Nunes, and Meneses 
incorporates the social construction of technoscientific knowledge and challenges the 
constant policing of the boundaries of science against other Northern ways of relating 
to the world dismissed as irrational, emotional, and unsystematic (Northern religion, 
arts, and humanities).7 De Sousa Santos et al.’s ecology of knowledges, in a sense, 
performs boundary leisure, that is, the opposite of boundary work, in its inclusion of 
the Northern socially-constructed and -situated technoscientific episteme, the North’s 
religious, artistic, and humanistic ways of knowing, and Southern epistemologies. 
When the Green Revolution unraveled in Mexico in the late 1970s, social scientists in 
close contact with Mexican farmers began to question the universality of 
technoscientific agronomy and reaffirm the value of indigenous Mexican ways of 
knowing. At the same time, Northern scholars of science and technology began 
substantiating science’s and technology’s social construction in earnest. 
In the same way that de Sousa Santos et al. see their ecology of knowledges as 
the expansion of epistemic options, Stephen Marglin, inversely, sees monolithic 
Northern-style development as the contraction of choice in many domains. In some 
domains, Northern modernization does expand choice, but falls far short of its 
                                                          
6 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Joao Arriscado Nunes, and Maria Paula Meneses, “Introduction: 
Opening Up the Canon of Knowledge and Recognition of Difference” in Another Knowledge is 
Possible: Beyond Northern Epistemologies (New York: Verso, 2007), xx. 
7 De Sousa Santos, et al., “Opening up the Canon of Knowledge,” xxx. 
Thomas F. Gieryn, “Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains 
and     Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists,” American Sociological Review 48, no. 
6 (Dec. 1983). 
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promises. In consumerism, democratic government, and secularism, Northern-style 
modernization claims as one of its virtues the expansion of choice as liberation from 
the choice constraints of subsistence scarcity, authoritarianism and traditional 
dogmatism. The delivery of a development package, such as the Green Revolution, is 
often construed as the presentation by the development agent to the Southerner of a 
choice between the agent’s Northern way of knowing and doing and the Southerner’s, 
but Marglin points out that when the imposition of a new choice displaces or eliminates 
extant (and more numerous polycultural) choices, Southerner’s options contract. When 
Southern knowledge, often maintained through the practice of craft and 
intergenerational knowledge transmission, is displaced in one generation, it is lost and 
can no longer exist parallel, and as an alternative, to the Northern way.8 As Shiva says 
of this irreversible forced contraction of choice, if Northern science were universal, it 
would “spread in openness,” and would not depend on coercion and the 
misrepresentation of other local knowledges as “primitive” and “unscientific.”9 Instead, 
in Shiva’s reckoning, the Northern technoscientific episteme is a local culturally-
particular epistemology like any other, globalized by force not by inherent universality. 
Like de Sousa Santos, et al. and Shiva, Marglin advocates for a diversity of knowledges, 
in our own self-interest and in the global interest, with an argument from uncertainty. 
When unforeseen twenty-first-century crises arrive, like a blight to a monocropped 
field, we will wish we had as many problem-solving approaches as possible, — at which 
                                                          
8 Stephen Marglin, “Towards the Decolonization of the Mind,” in Dominating Knowledge: 
Development, Culture, and Resistance, eds. Frederique Apffel Marglin and Stephen Marglin 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 1990), 4-6. 
9 Vandana Shiva, “Monocultures of the Mind,” in The Vandana Shiva Reader (Lexington, KY: 
UP of Kentucky, 2015), 72. 
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point, “it would be a cruel irony to find the world remade in our own image” — bereft of 
the resiliency of polyculture.10 
The repeated inclusion of Northern epistemologies in nascent Southern 
pluralist epistemologies, despite what would have been an understandable revanchist 
animus among Southern and Southern-sympathetic intellectuals, is consistent 
throughout these contemporary sociologies of knowledges and proposed 
epistemologies of the South. One such proposal is to hybridize subaltern and dominant 
epistemologies into “border thinking,” as Walter Mignolo convincingly does in Local 
Histories/Global Designs. Contrary to the totalizing colonial influence of the 
technoscientific episteme, Mignolo, with his border thinking, is “not attempting to find 
the only and correct concept that captures the ‘thing,’ the (master) empty signifier that 
will house the entire diversity of particulars.”11 To pretend to universality and 
singularity as the Northern episteme does would, for Mignolo, change the content 
(Southern instead of Northern) without changing the terms (totalizing) of the 
conversation. Instead, rather than to dominate, border thinking, arising from the 
myriad geographically-dispersed “wounds of colonialism,” is inherently “universally 
marginal, fragmentary, and unachieved.” What would be considered in the Northern 
episteme a failed attempt at systematization and horizontal integration prevents border 
thinking from stooping to totalizing “ethnocide.”12 
                                                          
10 Marglin, “Decolonization of the Mind,” 16. David Wade Chambers and Richard Gillespie put it 
similarly in their “Locality in the History of Science.” After the twentieth century’s completion of 
“a half-millennium of global multi-cultural engagement, marked principally by conflict and 
holocaust,” they suggest that by “helping preserve the multiple varieties of human 
understanding of the natural world” we can “improve the possibility of constructive cultural 
reconciliation in a deeply troubled world.” David Wade Chambers and Richard Gillespie, 
“Locality in the History of Science: Colonial Science, Technoscience, and Indigenous 
Knowledge,” Osiris: Nature and Empire: Science and the Colonial Enterprise Vol. 15 (2000), 
221-240. 
11 Walter Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and 
Border Thinking (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2012), 66. 
12 Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs, 68. 
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 That, in service to modernization theory, science could be party to ethnocide is 
puzzling to many Northerners inculcated in the Northern mode of understanding and 
organizing the world.13 Vandana Shiva sheds light on their believed immunity of 
science from the violence of which it is accused. The Northern knowledge taxonomy is 
composed of inter-referential assemblages of dichotomies: nature/culture, mind/body, 
masculine/feminine, and, under Shiva’s microscope, fact and value. According to this 
dichotomy, violence is situated in the realm of values, a byproduct of politics and ethics 
— if related at all to science and technology, only as an unintended consequence of a 
misapplication of science and technology. Science and technology are insulated from 
the violent ramifications of these misapplications by their supposed neutrality. 
Technoscience seeks asylum by inhabiting the realm of fact.14 This insistence on 
technoscience’s inherent neutrality will surface repeatedly in this thesis: at the 
beginning of the Green Revolution’s instantiation in Mexico, incredulous planners and 
quality-controlling social scientists placed the onus of blame for the Green Revolution’s 
slow gains on Mexican campesinxs, then on uncooperative socio-cultural and 
institutional arrangements resistant to agronomic, insurance, and commodity pricing 
adjustments. As the 1970s waned questions mounted about the neutrality of the 
technoscientific package itself, and then, only toward the end of the story, in the late 
1970s coincident with the rise of social constructivism in science and technology 
studies, would social scientists operating in Mexico begin to question technoscientific 
intervention and its foundational premise, modernization theory.15 The transition 
                                                          
13 Margin, “Decolonization of the Mind,” 24. Marglin insists culture is more than its set of 
largely tacit and unconscious rules and values — that cultures are likewise built of knowledge 
systems composed of epistemology, transmission, innovation, and power. 
14 Vandana Shiva, “Science and Politics in the Green Revolution,” in The Vandana Shiva Reader 
(Lexington, KY: UP of Kentucky, 2015), 17. 
15 Campesinx is simply a gender neutral combination of campesino and campesina. For an 
introduction to this convention, see: Yesenia Varela, “The Use of the “X”: An Effort to Make 




among Green Revolution social scientists from incredulity in the late 1960s to 
reformism in the early 1970s and eventually to outright condemnation in the late 1970s 
maps onto the Green Revolution’s trajectory from modernization theory’s exemplar to 
its undoer. The late twentieth and early twenty-first century proponents of 
epistemologies of the South latch onto historical antecedents like the Green Revolution 
in Mexico to make their case against contemporary development regimes. 
 For example, Shiva connects the violence of the Green Revolution to the very 
nature of a project that, “in its very genesis,” was “put forward as a political project for 
creating a social order based on peace and stability.”16 She deploys the social 
construction of scientific knowledge to connect and subordinate the supposedly value-
neutral technoscientific intervention package of the Green Revolution to the 
prerogatives of state-formation and the maintenance of socio-political order. For Shiva 
this connection represents an attempt at “social engineering.” Modernization theory 
became imperiled when social engineering endeavors began to display the unintended 
consequences that technoscientific interventions inevitably entail, and also when, as 
their social construction is revealed, technology and science lose their immunity to 
these unintended consequences. Through the evolution of social-scientific evaluations 
of the Green Revolution in Mexico throughout the 1970s this thesis shows both the 
unintended consequences of the Green Revolution and the loss of technoscience’s 
immunity to those consequences. Shiva, de Sousa Santos, Nunes, Meneses, Mingolo, 
and Marglin, then, can be grouped collectively as respondents to a crisis in 
modernization theory that began with the Green Revolution in Mexico. They are also 
proponents of a paradigmatic replacement: the restoration of subalternated 
epistemologies and the rejuvenation of the knowledge ecosystem (to expound on de 
                                                          
16 Shiva, “Science and Politics in the Green Revolution,” 16. 
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Sousa Santos’s metaphor) via the reintroduction of displaced epistemic species, the 
curtailment of an invasive predator, and the homeostatic stabilization of a new hybrid 
pluriversal knowledge ecosystem.17 
 
Methodology from the Sociology of Technoscientific Knowledge 
 This thesis reads the Green Revolution in Mexico as an historical precipitant of 
the crisis in modernization theory. Insofar as contemporary sociologists of knowledge 
view modernization theory as a threat to non-Northern knowledge systems, the Green 
Revolution’s precipitation of a crisis in modernization theory ties historical 
investigations of the Green Revolution to contemporary explorations of epistemological 
alternatives. Tariq Banuri, one of Marglin’s former advisees in Harvard’s Department 
of Economics, takes the crisis in modernization theory as his point of departure in 
search of validation for non-Northern ways of knowing. For Banuri, the proposal of 
epistemologies of the South in response to the crisis “derives not from the discovery of 
some hitherto unobserved social costs [epistemic marginalization, ecosystemic 
degradation, accentuated socio-economic inequality],” but, as I have shown in the work 
of Shiva, de Sousa Santos, Nunes, Meneses, Mingolo, and Marglin, from a 
rearticulation of those costs functioning as “essentially an affirmation of earlier 
doubts.”18 I contend that the Green Revolution was one of the wellsprings of those 
                                                          
17 Eben Kirksey, ed., The Multispecies Salon (Durham: Duke UP, 2014). 
Historiography as a genre is a subroutine of the Northern academic protocol heavily dependent 
on classification and taxonomy. I do not intend to be reductive about the variety and differences 
of Southern epistemologies that challenge the dominant technoscientific episteme by grouping 
them. 
For a cosmology that deals with the pluriverse, rather than the Northern cosmology of the 
universe, see: Cesar Carrillo Trueba, Pluriverso: Un Ensayo sobre el Conocimiento Indígena 
Contemporáneo (Mexico City: UNAM Press, 2012. (Pluriverso: An Essay on Contemporary 
Indigenous Knowledge). Chambers and Gillespie add to this in their section “Bringing Disparate 
Knowledge Systems Together.” Chambers and Gillespie, “Locality in the History of Science,” 
235-37. 
18 Tariq Banuri, “Development and the Politics of Knowledge: A Critical Interpretation of the 
Social Role of Modernization Theories in the Development of the Third World,” in Dominating 
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earlier doubts and, moreover, that those doubts arose as a byproduct of the same 
social-scientific evaluations designed to refine and facilitate the Green Revolution 
development regime. Banuri believes it necessary to “examine in detail the intellectual 
and cultural roots” of critiques of modernization. Using the Green Revolution in 
Mexico as an exemplar, in this thesis I intend to locate some of the intellectual and 
cultural roots of critiques of modernization in 1970s anthropology of development. 
 To that end, I show that the Green Revolution in Mexico was not a pure 
implementation of technoscience enshrined in neutrality and set apart from 
sociocultural concerns. Instead the Green Revolution development regime in Mexico 
was an inextricable interplay of its technoscientific intervention and a social-scientific 
intervention with which it was co-productive. I employ the concept of co-production set 
forth by Sheila Jasanoff, a sociologist of science and technology, in her seminal 2004 
volume States of Knowledge: The Co-production of Science and Social Order. Jasanoff 
developed the concept of co-production to facilitate conversations between STS and its 
disciplinary neighbors about the links between knowledge, culture, and power and to 
describe the feedback effects of the ways in which knowledge reconfigures social and 
political structures and how those reconfigurations subsequently alter the very terms in 
which we think about the world.19 For Jasanoff, co-production is an idiom to be used to 
describe complex entanglements between technoscientific and 
sociopolitical/institutional phenomena.  
Various dialects of that idiom, if not the term “co-production” itself, are 
inscribed in the aforementioned works of the sociology of knowledges. Marglin uses the 
mutually reinforcing nexus of liberal democratic government, rationalized bureaucracy, 
                                                          
Knowledge: Development, Culture, and Resistance, eds. Frederique Apffel Marglin and 
Stephen Marglin (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1990). 
19 Sheila Jasanoff, “The Idiom of Co-production,” in States of Knowledge: The Co-production of 
Science and Social Order (New York: Routledge, 2004), 2. 
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technoscientific industry and agriculture, and global commercial capitalism to describe 
both modernization theory and the process of interventionist modernization.20 Shiva 
not only describes the Green Revolution as a “political project for creating a social 
order,” as shown above, but states that the knowledge-power nexus is the essence of 
reductionism because mechanistic thought “was associated with a set of values based 
on power that was compatible with the needs of commercial capitalism” which 
“generates . . . domination.”21 Shiva also alludes to the co-productive relationship 
between science and state when she argues that Green Revolution technology “involved 
a restructuring of the way power was distributed in society” that “defined new links 
between the state and cultivators, between international interests and local 
communities . . ..”22 The idiom of co-production is also legible when de Sousa Santos, et 
al. locate the foundation stone of the “capitalist and imperial order that the global 
North has been imposing on the global South” in the “epistemological privilege” of 
modern science “which made possible the technological revolutions that consolidated 
Western supremacy.”23 Those supremacy-consolidating technological revolutions 
simultaneously accentuated the epistemological privilege of modern science. Even 
when they are not using the term “co-production,” these sociologists of knowledge are 
employing the idiom of co-production. 
 In this thesis, the idiom of co-production is used primarily and most 
substantially to detail the complex interdependency of technoscientific and social-
scientific work in the Green Revolution. To arbitrarily point to the “beginning” of a 
loop: the impetus for technological interventions in general and the Green Revolution 
in particular was the social scientific conception of a (Southern) “archaic” essential 
                                                          
20 Marglin, “Decolonization of the Mind,” 2. 
21 Shiva, “Science and Politics in the Green Revolution,” 17. 
22 Shiva, “Science and Politics in the Green Revolution,” 31-32. 
23 De Sousa Santos, “Opening up the Canon of Knowledge,” xix. 
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“peasantness” and a (Northern) “modern” self-interested economic rationale. The 
belief that modernization and the mentality of modernity could be tactically 
engendered in a target population was derived from progressive-era beliefs in social 
engineering that privileged social scientific modes of analysis. On the wave of social-
scientifically buttressed theories of modernization, development, and technological 
diffusion, American plant geneticists, soil scientists, entomologists, and other 
agronomists set to work implementing an agronomic intervention in Mexico. They 
developed technologies locally, imported technologies from the United States, and 
assembled these technologies into deployment packages. After deployment, various 
social scientists visited the zones of implementation, studying farmers and 
communities, and produced econometric algorithms and ethnographies to model 
Mexican farmers’ receptiveness to these technoscientific packages. The results of this 
social-scientific labor were then fed back to development planners and agronomic 
managers so that the technoscientific packages could be refined and redeployed. The 
bulk of this thesis’s primary source analysis works to trace this loop using ethnographic 
and econometric studies by scholars from both within the Rockefeller Foundation and 
outside it (though often still funded by it) between 1965 and 1979. 
I have stated my argument that technoscientific and social-scientific 
interventions co-produced one another to form the Green Revolution development 
regime, but, as one might glean from the subtitle of States of Knowledge, with what 
statist components was that development regime co-productive?24 According to its 
planners, scientific triumphalists, and the Nobel committee that awarded Norman 
Borlaug, the Green Revolution wheat breeder, the Nobel Peace Prize in 1970, the Green 
                                                          
24 Not all syntactical elements of this new “idiom” of co-production are yet standardized. It is 
worth noting that once you believe you are beginning to understand the structural properties of 
co-productivity, you begin to realize how difficult it is to apply prepositions to. 
14 
 
Revolution aimed to thwart a post-World War II population boom-induced Malthusian 
cataclysm and save innumerable Third World masses from starvation or 
malnourishment; the U.S., Mexican, and Rockefeller planners and agronomists 
probably believed this to an extent.25 However, this thesis, more suggestively than 
substantively, proposes a set of embedded hierarchical co-productive relationships in 
which the co-produced development regime of the Green Revolution was nested. One 
level up from the Green Revolution at the national scale, for the Mexican federal 
government under Ávila Camacho (1940-1946), the Green Revolution was co-
productive with the Mexican strategy to industrialize and urbanize its economy and 
with the Mexican policy of indigenismo. Indigenismo was an integrationist policy to 
incorporate Mexico’s indigenous population, along with its European and culturally-
European mestizo population, into a new singularly Mexican national identity. 
Economic industrialization, urbanization, and cultural integration were 
subcomponents of Mexico’s modernization strategy. Another level up, at the 
international scale, the co-produced modernization of Mexico was also co-productive 
with American Cold War pseudo-territorialization — the attempt to carve out a sphere 
of liberal democratic and capitalist influence as a bastion against Soviet 
expansionism.26 
Historical Background and Analysis of Green Revolution Stakeholders 
The Co-production of the Green Revolution and American Cold War 
Objectives: Pseudo-territorialization of a Liberal-Democratic Capitalist Sphere of 
Influence 
                                                          
25 Bernard Weinraur, “US Agronomist gets Nobel Peace Prize,” New York Times, October 22, 
1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/10/22/archives/us-agronomist-gets-nobel-peace-prize-
1970-nobel-peace-prize-won-by.html 
26 Joseph Cotter, Troubled Harvest:Agronomy and Revolution in Mexico, 1880-2002 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 263. 
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 From the perspective of the United States, the Green Revolution is best 
understood by its Cold War orientation. Although the Green Revolution in Mexico 
officially began in 1943, President Truman’s 1949 inaugural address demonstrates the 
relationship between American Cold War pseudo-territorialization and international 
development programs like the Green Revolution. The speech was designed to counter 
the “false philosophy of communism” in four points. After reaffirming U.S. support for 
the United Nations, the global post-war economic recovery, and the promise to 
“strengthen freedom-loving nations against the dangers of aggression” in the first three 
points, the fourth point reads: “we must embark on a bold new program for making the 
benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the 
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.”27 In some ways this was related to 
the dual Malthusian spectre of overpopulation and food insecurity used to 
propagandize the Green Revolution. Policy planners, politicians, and economists 
believed that food shortages would radicalize Southern subsistence farmers and drive 
them into Stalin’s (or soon Mao’s) waiting arms. Contrarily, exporting American 
agricultural implements and scientists would lead to scientific, technological, and 
economic “modernization,” which would in turn lead to democratization and the 
stability of an international capitalist market.28 Drawing the through line between 
industrial development and democracy even more confidently, W. Arthur Lewis, the St. 
Lucian recipient of the 1979 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics for his work on 
                                                          
27 Harry S. Truman, “Truman’s Inaugural Address,” Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and 
Museum, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/50yr_archive/inagural20jan1949.htm 
28 Howard P. Segal, “Progress and Its Discontents: Postwar Science and Technology Policy,” in 
The Social Sciences Go to Washington: The Politics of Knowledge in the Postmodern Age, ed. 
Hamilton Cravens (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 2004), 112-113. 
   Audra J. Wolfe, Competing with the Soviets: Science, Technology, and the State in Cold War 
America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2013), 55-56. 
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growth, wrote: “The case for economic growth is that it gives man more control over his 
environment, and thereby increases his freedom.”29 
These “unscientific” premises for intervention, according to Howard P. Segal, 
were “papered over” with “self-consciously scientific” models full of statistics and 
graphs, subordinating social-scientific modeling to modernization theory’s neoliberal 
philosophical tenets. But Segal does not discuss how the econometric and sociological 
models and theoretical premises of technological intervention actually produced one 
another.30 This thesis takes a step in that direction. Regardless of its feasibility, the 
cachet of modernization theory demonstrates the contemporaneous awareness of the 
relationship between Cold War geopolitical goals and the expansion of Northern 
technoscience, clearly conveyed in Truman’s inauguration speech. Two of the most 
prominent exponents of modernization theory, Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, 
hypothesized that human attitudes could be devised as combinations of dichotomies 
they called “pattern variables” — another model — used to arrange societies on a 
continuum from “traditional” to “modern.”31 The use of such dichotomies as both 
behavioral assumptions and building blocks of behavioral models will surface 
repeatedly in this thesis and was representative of Northern mechanistic attitudes to 
understanding nature and, as often, was antithetical to alternative Southern 
epistemologies. 
                                                          
29 W. Arthur Lewis, The Theory of Economic Growth (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1955), 
421. Quoted from Marglin, “Decolonization of the Mind,” 11. 
    Regrettably absent from this thesis is the role played by institutions of capital and 
multinational corporations in the socio-technical intervention of Mexico in the Cold War. Marx, 
Marxists and other scholars of Taylorism and the regimentation of labor have well established 
the role of regimentation in the capitalist control of production and laborers, for example: Harry 
Braverman, “Technology and Capitalist Control,” in The Social Shaping of Technology, 2nd Ed., 
eds. Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1999), 158-
160. 
30 Segal, “Progress and Its Discontents,” 113. 
31 Wolfe, Competing with the Soviets, 60. 
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Although modernization theory served well to encourage the promotion of 
economic growth through the technoscientific industrial development of the South, it 
did not initially provide a theoretical basis for connecting the goals of economic and 
technoscientific development to geopolitical strategy. John Perkins, in his Geopolitics 
and the Green Revolution echoed this sentiment in his attempt to make clear just such 
a relationship: “Aside from imperialism, therefore, in 1939 no analytical framework 
existed to see how agricultural science and technology and modernization of agriculture 
fit into the overall scheme of international relations and power.”32 The Cold War, of 
course, had yet to flare up during modernization theory’s infancy, but the rise of the 
Soviet “menace” made possible the conflation of food instability, political 
radicalization, and the fear of Soviet expansionism. By 1949, Truman, on the basis of 
this conflation, was able to justify a geopolitically-strategic technoscientific 
intervention on a supposedly non-imperialistic theoretical foundation, completing the 
coupling of modernization theory, and by association agricultural development in 
Mexico, to Cold War pseudo-territorialization.33 
The Co-Production of the Green Revolution and Mexican Cold War Objectives: 
National Identity Formation and Modernization 
 One of the “underdeveloped areas” Truman was silently alluding to in his four 
point plan was Mexico. Although plans for an agricultural intervention in Mexico date 
loosely back to the 1930s, they began in earnest in 1941 when the Rockefeller 
foundation sent a survey team to conduct a feasibility study. Just prior to that, the U.S. 
                                                          
32 John Perkins, Geopolitics and the Green Revolution (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997), 103. 
Perkins’s book is an invaluable resource for understanding the relationship between the Green 
Revolution and the expansion of American influence during the Cold War, but it approaches its 
themes from the perspective of political ecology and not the history of science or technology. 
33 For a discussion of the newly-found 20th century ability of science to “become an authority to 
legitimate public action,” and for a general overview of the relationship between science, 
political, power, and the state, see: Dominique Pestre, “Science, Political Power, and the State,” 
in Companion to Science in the Twentieth Century, eds. John Krige and Dominique Pestre 
(New York: Routledge, 2003), 61-76. 
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sent Henry Wallace, then Vice President under Roosevelt, former Secretary of 
Agriculture, and strong proponent of 1930s progressivism a la American governmental 
development-oriented intervention during the Great Depression, to Mexico as the U.S. 
ambassador to Ávila Camacho’s December, 1940 inauguration. Part of Camacho’s 
modernization plan for Mexico included the policy of indigenismo. The politics of 
indigenismo policy, and national ethno-identity formation in general, in Mexico are 
convoluted and, in any great detail, beyond the scope of this study, but Camacho, 
through primary and secondary school curricular reforms and other nationalism-
generating standard fare, continued the indigenismo policy of his predecessor Lázaro 
Cárdenas. Cárdenas was, in his own words, “not concerned with keeping the Indians as 
Indians, or with indianizing Mexico, but rather with mexicanizing the Indians.”34 One 
component of Mexico’s modernization, then, required the homogenization of its 
culturally-disparate demographic subgroups into a singular Mexican national identity 
adopting the Northern attitudes to industrialism and secularism of its European and 
mestizo populations. 
Camacho differed from Cárdenas when it came to economic policy, however. 
Cárdenas was a campesinx-oriented socialist intent on fulfilling the goals of the 1910 
Mexican Revolution. He redistributed more hacienda land to small-holder farmers and 
ejidatarios than any other president since agrarian reform became the defining 
promise of the 1910 revolution. Camacho, alternatively, was concerned with the 
modernization of Mexico’s agricultural and industrial sectors and the urbanization that 
would entail. The Green Revolution serviced all of these policy aims. Camacho’s vision 
for an urbanized technologically-driven Mexican economy can be described by what 
Carol E. Harrison and Ann Johnson call a “national imaginary.” In their introduction to 
                                                          
34 Larissa Lomnitz, “Anthropology and Development in Latin America,” Human Organization 
38, no. 3 (Fall 1979), 314. 
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National Identity: The Role of Science and Technology, Harrison and Johnson argue 
that nations use scientific prowess to perform their modernity, both to other nations 
and to their citizens whom they hope to enlist in that national imaginary.35 Insofar as 
technoscientific prowess exists in a generative relationship with a national imaginary, 
we can talk about Jasanoffian “sociotechnical imaginaries.” It is not a contention of this 
thesis, but a difficult-to-set-aside implicit assumption underneath the analytical work 
of this thesis, that the co-production of the Green Revolution and American Cold War 
pseudo-territorialization, or of the Green Revolution and Mexican modern national 
identity, function as sociotechnical imaginaries to the extent that these undertakings 
were mythologized as wars against world hunger, the spread of the “disease of 
communism,” or the glorification of Mexico vis-a-vis its place in Latin America and the 
world. 
The Green Revolution Itself 
 As for the technoscientific intervention of the Green Revolution, after the initial 
survey expedition in 1941, the Rockefeller Foundation, in conjunction with the Mexican 
federal government, initiated the Mexican Agricultural Program (MAP) and formed the 
Office of Special Studies to build research stations in 1943. The Rockefeller Foundation 
deployed plant geneticists, soil scientists, entomologists, and plant pathologists to the 
                                                          
35 Carol E. Harrison and Ann Johnson, “Introduction: Science and National Identity,” Osiris: 
National Identity: The Role of Science and Technology, Vol. 24, eds. Carol E. Harrison and Ann 
Johnson (2009), 1-14. Harrison and Johnson, and the many authors contributing to this edited 
volume, locate national identity “in the conjunction of modern professional science, state 
sponsorship, and an engaged citizenry” (p. 3). Suzanne Moon’s study set in Indonesia, “Justice, 
Geography, and Steel: Technology and National Identity in Indonesian Industrialization is a 
characteristic example with informative applicability to the Mexican case. Where Suharto 
sought to unify the geographically and ethnolinguistically dispersed new Indonesia with a steel 
plant in West Java, the Mexican government under Ávila Camacho sought unification through 
agricultural technoscientification and the urbanization it would induce. Harrison and Johnson 
do not, however, describe this conjunction as the site of a complex co-productive relationship, as 
I attempt to in this thesis. The case studies in the edited volume cover much ground, but their 
examples “drawn from a variety of Eastern and Western nation-states” very much stick that 
longitudinal arrangement — the only cases outside of Europe and settler-colonized North 
America are set in India, China, and Indonesia — and none from Latin America. Mexico, if 
studied from their perspective should be added as a case study. 
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Office of Special Studies to develop hybrid wheat and maize seeds (HYVs, high-yielding 
varieties) adapted to conditions in Mexico’s central highlands east of Mexico City at the 
agricultural college at Chapingo.36 In 1966, control was officially handed over from the 
Rockefeller Foundation to the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture, although the 
Rockefeller agents remained in all their capacities, resulting in the termination of the 
Office of Special Studies and its transformation into the International Maize and Wheat 
Improvement Center (sp. acronym, CIMMYT), a global institution that coordinated the 
deployment of the Mexican agricultural industrialization model to India, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, North Africa, and Colombia, among other places. At the same time, initial 
shortcomings in the Green Revolution deployment in Mexico were becoming evident. 
Yield increases from HYV wheat development, optimized for mechanized irrigation and 
ultra-high doses of synthetic fertilizer, far outpaced maize HYV development. This 
privileged wealthy wheat farmers with large holdings in northwestern Mexico and 
drastically accentuated socio-economic stratification between these industrial farmers 
and the campesinx small-holder farmers and ejidatarios who subsisted off of maize and 
made up the vast majority of Mexican farmers.37 This “shortcoming” led to the creation 
of Plan Puebla in 1967, an attempt to replicate the gains made in wheat HYV 
development, but refocused for rainfed, often subsistence-level maize farmers. In 1970, 
Borlaug, who worked on the wheat program, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, yet 
Plan Puebla quickly proved inefficacious; the attempt to breed high yielding-varieties of 
maize adapted to the numerous climatic and biological zones of Mexico was 
abandoned, and efforts were redirected toward the creation of input recommendations 
                                                          
36 For a discussion, instead of social scientific reactions to the Green Revolution in Mexico, of 
the reactions of Mexican agronomy students at the National School of Agriculture at Chapingo 
during the student uprisings in 1967, see: Matthew Caire-Perez, “A Different Shade of Green : 
Efraím Hernández, Chapingo, and Mexico's Green Revolution, 1950-1967” (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Oklahoma, 2016). 
37 Cotter, Troubled Harvest, 263. 
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(of fertilizers, biocides, water, and planting densities and schedules) for different bio- 
and climate regions of Mexican maize growing. Beginning in the early 1970s, and with 
finality by 1979, the end of this study period, the deleterious ecological, cultural, and 
socio-economic consequences of the Green Revolution had become difficult to ignore. 
Still, work in agricultural industrialization and systematization through international 
intervention continues in Mexico and everywhere in various forms and to varying 
degrees.38 
The Anthropological Debate on Essential “Peasantness” 
Attempts to explicate an essentializing and homogenous “peasantness” 
undergirded anthropological, sociological, and econometric field work in Mexico. 
Anthropologists were especially eager to enter into debates about the inherent and 
“natural” conservatism of “the peasant”. Generating a dichotomy of peasant 
mentalities, anthropologists debated whether cultural or material factors predominated 
in peasant choice-making, with one cohort of anthropologists asserting that cultural 
factors enforced adherence to tradition (and thus rendered the campesinx inherently 
conservative), while an opposing cohort of anthropologists insisted that campesinxs 
were amenable to financial incentives and status enhancements through the acquisition 
of personal property and were thus inherently innovative. 
This debate came to a head in American Anthropologist between 1972 and 1976 
in a flurry of line-in-the-sand-drawing assertions and consequent retorts. This eruption 
is somewhat surprising because Frank C. Miller, just 7 years prior, found no reason for 
                                                          
38 Focusing on the post-Cold War United States in which many, including Jasanoff, see a 
“runaway ambition to impose military dominance, ideological conformity, and cultural 
homogeneity on the rest of the world,” Sheila Jasnoff provides another chapter in the Green 
Revolution saga by looking at what some are calling a “Second Green Revolution” in which 
genetic engineering, gene splicing, and cell fusion are used to create new synthetic cultivars to 
be deployed through new neo-colonial (if such a term can be written) technoscientific 
interventions. Sheila Jasanoff, “Biotechology and Empire: The Global Power of Seeds and 
Science,” Osiris: Global Power Knowledge: Science and Technology in International Affairs 
Vol. 21, eds. John Krige and Kai-Henrik Barth (2006), 273-292. 
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anthropologists to participate in these polarizing debates in his “Cultural Change as 
Decision-Making: A Tzotzil Example,” where he studied the acceptance and use of a 
medical outpost by a Tzetal community in highland Chiapas.After conducting extensive 
ethnographic work in the community Miller concluded definitively that “[t]he extent to 
which such choices are ultimately determined by cultural or material factors is an issue 
that is not empirically resoluble at the present time. . . . I maintain only that both 
affirmation and denial are metaphysical stances, neither of which can be proved by 
anthropology.”39 Despite Miller’s warning, between 1972 and 1978 several 
anthropologists nonetheless debated the essential mental qualities of “peasanthood.” 
In hindsight, from the vantage point of 1978, Clawson was able to summarize 
this debate and reformulate its dichotomies into a workable hybrid methodological 
approach for his 1979 study of the Puebla community of Nealtican. Clawson first 
strengthens the dichotomy by condensing its positions in sections entitled “Peasants 
Are Poor Innovators” and “Peasants Are Good Innovators.” Of those who insisted 
peasants were poor innovators, Clawson included Charles Erasmus’s Man Takes 
Control (1961), Oscar Lewis’s Life in a Mexican Village: Tepoztlán Restudied (1951), H. 
Ian Hogbin’s Social Change (1958), and George Foster’s “Peasant Society and the 
Image of the Limited Good” (1965) and Applied Anthropology (1969). George Foster’s 
concept of the “Image of the Limited Good” asserted that for peasant societies there 
exists a finite amount of zero-sum “good” and consequently, “innovative people tend to 
be seen as rapacious and greedy. Because they are upsetting the traditional distribution 
of ‘good,’ of the limited resources of the group, they are viewed as threats to community 
stability rather than as entrepreneurial models to be emulated.”40 This claim, without 
                                                          
39 Frank C. Miller, “Cultural Change as Decision-Making: A Tzotzil Example,” Ethnology 4, No. 1 
(Jan. 1965), 54. 
40 George Foster, Applied Anthropology (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), 83. 
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caveats to certain places, ethno-linguistic groups, or times, would become the focus of 
rebuttals. 
Punning off of Foster, James Acheson rejected his view with “Limited Good or 
Limited Goods? Response to Economic Opportunity in a Tarascan Pueblo” in 1972. 
Rather than a cognitive inhibition to innovation, Acheson argued that it was, instead, a 
lack of access to credit, favorable markets, capital, and the risk-security they provided 
that prevented peasants from engaging in entrepreneurial activity. Acheson drew a 
direct contrast with Foster by paraphrasing Foster’s description in Tzintzuntzan: 
Mexican Peasants in a Changing World (1967) of how innovation was stifled by 
interpersonal relationships in Tarascan communities because they were  “marked by 
suspicion, vindictiveness, spite, envy, malicious gossip, and lack of cooperation.”41 
Although Acheson may have taken liberties with that provocative litany of descriptors,, 
he was careful to use Foster’s own words to substantiate the sentiment he opposed: “[a] 
large part of this inability and reluctance to change is due, as we have seen, to 
personality and social factors: village culture and society, reflecting a cognitive 
orientation that views all good things in life as finite . . ..”42 Acheson’s countervailing 
view, which he expected to be revealed through his research was that some Tarascan 
farmers are motivated by economic incentives, and concluded that “[t]he presence of 
superior economic opportunities is the single most important factor involved in 
developmental change.”43 Acheson also emphasized that indigenous Mexican 
smallholder farmers could innovate without the intervention of an external agency. It is 
important to note, however, that the entrepreneurial attitude Acheson identified in 
                                                          
41 James M. Acheson, “Limited Good or Limited Goods? Response to Economic Opportunity in 
a Tarascan Pueblo,” American Anthropologist 74, no. 5 (Oct. 1972), 1152. 
42 George M. Foster, Tzintzuntzan: Mexican Peasants in a Changing World (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1967), 250. Quoted in Acheson, 1152-53. 
43 Acheson, 1161. 
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some of the subjects of his ethnography did not prevent him from considering much of 
the Tarascan community to be stymied by “cognitive factors,” and while he affirmed the 
presence of the unquestioned virtue of profit-maximizing behavior in some members of 
the Tarascan community of Tzintzuntzan, he simultaneously affirmed areductive 
dichotomy for understanding the peasant mentality by envisioning his subject 
community in terms of those for whom the economic opportunities available overrode 
the cultural barriers, and those for whom they did not. 
In true Hegelian dialectic form, it seems, Foster’s thesis and Acheson’s 
antithesis necessitated a synthesis, and it was supplied by John Kunkel in his 1976 
“Opportunity, Economics, and Behavior: A Comment on Acheson and Foster.” Kunkel 
put the dichotomous formulation of economic and cultural factors in decision-making 
present in Acheson’s and Foster’s work under scrutiny, and aptly characterized it as 
“more of an academic artifact than a reflection of village life, [one that] unduly 
obscures their mutual influences.”44 Kunkel instead offered a view of decision-making 
as a moment-contingent interplay of the diachronic consequences of an idiosyncratic 
individual’s calculations, imaginings, and assumptions. These consequences could take 
material form — as the proponents of peasant innovativeness assumed predominated 
in any “rational” person— but they could also be symbolic, affect interpersonal 
relations, or be intrinsic or extrinsic.45 Kunkel also criticized attempts to model the 
peasant mentality not only for their binaries and reductivity, but for their failure to 
distinguish between etic and emic understandings of behavior. Put simply, the emic 
views are decision-makers’ own understandings of their decision-making priorities and 
process, while the etic view is an outside observer’s understanding of another’s 
                                                          
44 John H. Kunkel, “Opportunity, Economics, and Behavior: A Comment on Acheson and 
Foster,” American Anthropologist 78, no. 2 (Jun. 1976), 327. 
45 Kunkel, “Opportunity, Economics, and Behavior,” 328. 
25 
 
decision-making priorities and process. Failure to be mindful of this disconnect 
deceives observers into believing the subjects of their observations act on the values 
that the observer assigns them. Kunkel implied Acheson and Foster were guilty of this 
category mistake in their respective assumptions of an economically “rational” peasant 
responsive to external stimuli (in our case by Northern development agents) and an 
intrinsically obstinate tradition-bound peasant.46 It might be noted that ethnographic 
methodology at this time was prone to tripping the emic-etic booby trap by establishing 
an etic approach in the hypothesis of the project, in which the ethnographer brought 
assumptions about the community into the study. 
Kunkel’s insinuation that Acheson and Foster were failing to perform basic 
ethnographic quality control was answered by Acheson in a reply to Kunkel’s 
accusations in the same issue of American Anthropologist. Whereas Kunkel 
emphasized the mutual influence of material and socio-cultural factors, Acheson here 
provided a reason for their compartmentalization: namely, that material factors are 
readily quantifiable while socio-cultural factors are only quantifiable with great 
difficulty, if at all. Though Acheson admitted to the econometrician’s propensity to 
assume that material rewards are all that matter, that “man is nothing as much as 
bribeable,” he justified this heuristic by the effectiveness of the tools econometricians 
can develop when they ignore those difficult to quantify socio-cultural factors.47 This is 
best exemplified when Acheson points out that “[w]hen econometricians are modeling 
economic and social variables together, it is no accident that the social variables are 
                                                          
46 For a more thorough look at Kunkel’s study of behavioral modeling see: John H. Kunkel, 
“Economic Autonomy and Social Change in Mexican Villages,” Economic Development and 
Cultural Change 10, no. 1 (Oct. 1961), 51-63; and John H. Kunkel, “Some Behavioral Aspects of 
the Ecological Approach to Social Organization,” American Journal of Sociology 73, no. 1 (Jul. 
1967), 12-29. 
47 James M. Acheson, “New Directions in Economic Anthropology? A Comment on Kunkel,” 
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usually expressed as constants in the equation.”48This statement is an excellent 
formulation of the state of development-oriented economics, sociology, and 
anthropology in the period. 
What was at stake in these anthropological debates over  peasants, as an 
academic-artificial global superclass was the validity of  econometricians devising 
algorithmic models of peasant behavior in order to more effectively alter the 
institutional framework of the communities to which the transfer of Northern 
technoscientific objects and ideas was believed to be necessary. In these econometric 
algorithms, those factors held in highest esteem in the Northern priority scheme — 
material and financial factors — were most readily instantiated in behavior models as 
variables, facilitating the optimization of the algorithms. On the other hand,socio-
cultural factors — symbolism, nonmaterial sources of status, and interpersonal 
relationships — were non-optimizable, and could only be registered as estimated 
constants in the algorithm. In the end, according to Acheson, these factors could be 
ignored because the econometric model worked well as a heuristic without them. 
Kunkel incisively identified the methodological underpinning of this 
algorithmic workflow as the quest for the fabled Homo economicus. This “economic 
man,” best represented for our purposes by Acheson’s model of “Limited Goods,” was 
an attempt to develop an econometric protocol to model, predict, and influence 
microeconomic decision-making predicated on the assumption that individuals will act 
so as to maximize their financial status, and that their decisions were thus reducible to 
cost-benefit analyses.49 This attempt to produced totalizing models of decision-making 
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for prediction and control demands special scrutiny in the context of a neo-colonialist 
enterprise such as the Green Revolution in Mexico because such models were devised 
in a Northern liberal-democratic context in which, in theory, microeconomic decisions 
arise from voluntary transactional or contractual arrangements between buyers and 
sellers or producers and consumers. In a neo-colonial context, models of “man” are not 
used to merely reflect and understand voluntary arrangements but to make and 
perpetuate involuntary ones. 
Some of the related questions I touch upon in the following chapters, or from 
which the following chapters touch off are: How were models of man developed and 
optimized on American consumers and laborers adapted to Mexican small-holder 
farmers? What were the social-scientific justifications for generalizing across Northern 
consumers, global Southern peasants (conceived of as a homogenous entity), and 
Mexican small-holder farmers to create a universal model of “man”? What does this 
presumed universality of model-making reveal about social-scientific conceptions of 
human nature and pan-human homogeneity in the 1970s? If the universality of 
totalizing models of “man” were assumed and imposed, as Homo economicus was 
presumed to be the sole demographic of the capitalist world, to what extent did the 
attempt to sculpt “the peasant” into a model rational-economic actor contribute to the 
inculcation of indigenous agriculturalists into Northern capitalist agriculture and 
Mexican nationalist identity? What is the relationship between these models of man 
and the MAP, CIMMYT, and Plan Puebla agro-development projects in Mexico 
between 1943 and 1979? Were the models of man recalibrated in light of the Mexican 
case? Were agro-development projects, ostensibly only designed to increase food 
stability and food independence in Mexico, used as test cases for refining models of 
economic command and control? How does the model-predict-control social-scientific 
workflow reflect Northern presuppositions about how knowledge is generated and 
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operationalized? Does the case of the Green Revolution in Mexico — in both its 
technoscientific agricultural implementation and social-scientific analysis and 
refinement — represent an attempt to radically reformulate Mexican indigenous and 
campesinx epistemic principles and institutions in the image of the Northern model?  
These questions both helped produce this thesis and often arise out of its claims 
and evidentiary documents, but answering all of them, or any of them with any degree 
of comprehensiveness, is not the chief aim of this thesis. Instead, this thesis hopes to 
demonstrate the need for preparatory exploration to clarify the operating assumptions 
of Northern techno- and social scientific interventions in the South. This thesis, 
however hints at the scholarly possibilities of such questions for anti- and post-colonial 
history, and insists to other historians, especially in science and technology studies, 
that an essential starting point is recognizing the tripartite co-production of (1) the 
Northern episteme (the scientific method, for the sake of brevity); (2) power-
asymmetric governmental, para-governmental, and multinational corporate 
interventionism in the South by the North; and (3) a new liberal-democratic industrial-
capitalist Mexican nationalism.50  
Before we can begin to explore the ramifications of these questions in social-
scientific case/field studies of agricultural development in Mexico, we must first assess 
the literature between 1956 and 1973 on agro-development that incentivized and 
legitimized social science field studies. This undergirding agro-development literature 
discussed the prospects and pitfalls of the Green Revolution’s deployment in Mexico, 
or, with a wider focus, theorized a framework for “diffusion studies,” the scientific 
approach to facilitating technology transfers anywhere. The Rockefeller endeavor in 
Mexico was in this light construed as laboratory in which theories of diffusion studies 
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become operative. Underneath these diffusion studies was the Northern-centric 
assumption that technoscientific fluency and production capacity was synonymous 
with cultural sophistication and superiority. The transfer of technology from the United 
States to Mexico, from this perspective, becomes a civilizing mission — another white 
man’s burden — placing it more firmly in the analytic framework of anti- and post-
colonial studies.51 
Interpretations of the Green Revolution in Mexico: Economics and 
Diffusion Theory 
One such commentary on technological diffusion with an eye on Mexico was 
Arthur T. Mosher’s “A Review and Criticism of United States Participation in 
Agricultural Programs of Technical Cooperation,” written in 1956 while he was 
employed at the Agricultural Development Council (then called The Council on 
Economic and Cultural Affairs, Inc.), an auxiliary institution to the Rockefeller 
Foundation founded by John D. Rockefeller III in 1954. Once a Presbyterian 
missionary to India in the 1930s, Mosher was trained as an agricultural economist 
before working for the Agricultural Development Council; a year after publishing this 
“Review and Criticism,” he was appointed to its executive directorship. In this article, 
Mosher reflected prevalent attitudes concerning Southern small-holder farmer 
traditionalism or “choice-making” described above. First, Mosher established his 
argument on the fundamental assumption, informed by the work of Charles Erasmus 
and George Foster, that: 
[an] important characteristic of the cultures of most underdeveloped regions is 
the fact that their agricultural economies are traditional rather than choice-
making. The prevailing pattern is for each new generation to be initiated to the 
care of traditional crops, in traditional ways, with traditional tools and 
implements. People are not encouraged to weigh alternatives and to make 
                                                          
51 For more on the relationship between technology, dominance, and conceptions of 
“civilization,” see: Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technologies, and 
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choices, yet it is these processes of weighing alternatives and making choices that 
are central to agricultural development.52 
 
Mosher went on to call the “widespread attitude in agriculturally underdeveloped 
countries” of seeking the benefits of new agricultural technology without having to 
relinquish traditional beliefs as “untenable” and declared that “important noneconomic 
aspects of each regional culture must change, both as a result of the specific new 
techniques introduced and as a precondition of more rapid agricultural development 
(emphasis mine).”53 Coming from an executive of a Rockefeller-funded para-
governmental entity with significant influence over the process of economic agro-
development, this statement demonstrates the presumed inextricability of 
technological transfer and sociocultural intervention. The technoscientific package of 
synthetic inputs, engineered seeds, and electromechanized planting, harvesting, and 
irrigation was to be bundled with a sociocultural package of institutional overhaul and 
reeducation in the practice of Northern technoscientific research, development, 
deployment, and extension-based education, amounting to, in Mosher’s words, a 
“cultural and psychological revolution.” 
Mosher here also hinted at the co-production of these two bundled packages: 
the new techniques were to precipitate sociocultural changes, and this changed 
sociocultural milieu — remade to be receptive to Northern technoscience would 
facilitate more rapid agricultural development. As John Perkins would put it when 
explaining the then nascent field of political ecology, “both the modifications of the 
biosphere and the political economic structures have a history that affects subsequent 
efforts to change either the technology or the social structure of agriculture.”54 Mosher’s 
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of Technical Cooperation, Journal of Farm Economics 38, no. 5 (Dec. 1956), 1198. 
53 Mosher, “A Review and Criticism,” 1199. 
54 Perkins, Geo-politics and the Green Revolution, 7-8. 
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insistence on the inextricability of agricultural intervention and sociopolitical 
intervention, though by no means made within the intellectual framework of political 
ecology, was an episode of that “history” Perkins referred to. By insisting that a 
sociocultural intervention was necessary for a successful technoscientific intervention, 
development planners like Mosher provided the justification needed to expand the 
mandate of development aid from food security to institutional adjustment for Cold 
War geopolitical strategy. 
 While Mosher was, as an employee, interested in the application of diffusion 
theory to Rockefeller-supported endeavors, such scholars as the sociologists Elihu Katz, 
Martin Levin, and Herbert Hamilton gave an overview of diffusion studies with only 
passing reference to examples of agricultural diffusion in 1963. Katz, et al., provided a 
general model of diffusion in seven parts as “the (1) acceptance, (2) over time, (3) of 
some specific item — an idea or practice, (4) by individuals, groups or other adopting 
units, linked to (5) specific channels of communication, (6) to a social structure, and (7) 
to a given system of values, or culture.”55 Although not as particularly interested as the 
Rockefeller-employed Mosher, Katz, et al., were by no means disinterested observers of 
the process of diffusion: they actively promoted it and their article sought to generalize 
approaches to quantify it. They considered the time element of crucial importance, 
necessary for identifying early-adopting individuals and their characteristics, for 
charting diffusion curves. Such curves facilitated the construction of mathematical 
models of diffusion, lauded by Katz, et al., and which they used to foreshadow and 
fertilize later field studies by suggesting that, “for example, one can construct 
theoretical models of the diffusion process given certain assumptions and compare the 
results with those actually observed in the real world. On the basis of such a 
                                                          
55 Elihu Katz, Martin Levin and Herbert Hamilton, “Traditions of Research on the Diffusion of 
Innovation,” American Sociological Review 28, no. 2 (April 1963), 237. 
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comparison, one can infer whether a given item is ‘contagious’ or not . . ..”56 Besides the 
time factor, the entire seven-part diffusion process Katz, et al., outlined above 
represented a mechanistic approach to cultural change, one derived from the Northern 
epistemic mode. This approach prioritizes atomistic problem solving and the belief that 
complex organic phenomena can be understood quantitatively as sums of discrete 
subcomponents, rather than as contingent hybridities of elaborate interdependencies 
subject to chaotic combinatorics, as we now understand ecosystems.57 Echoes of Katz’s 
mechanistic attitude to cultural change and technological diffusion, and even of his 
seven-part process model, are evident in the field studies of Jones, Benito, Moscardi, 
and De Janvry between 1973 and 1977. Katz, et al.’s model casts the dynamics of 
technological diffusion as a “science,” with lawful regularities and manipulable 
variables: a set of causal claims about how technological and industrial artifacts, 
techniques, and mentalities could be purposely engendered in a target population. Put 
simply, because of the co-production of technoscience and state power, I treat diffusion 
studies as the science of neo-coloniality. 
 As with Mosher, E. Walter Coward and Wayne A. Schutjer, an agricultural 
economist at Pennsylvania State University and the Director of the Research and 
Training Network at the Agricultural Development Council, also alluded to the co-
production of technoscientific and socio-cultural components of development. They 
recognized that “a change in either technology or organization will create tension for 
subsequent adjustment in the other” in their 1970 overview “The Green Revolution: 
Initiating and Sustaining Change.”58 Coward and Schutjer extended this theoretical 
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58 E. Walter Coward and Wayne A. Schutjer, “The Green Revolution: Initiating and Sustaining 
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perspective by arguing that this co-productive relationship between technology and 
organization often failed when technology was first introduced in order to induce 
institutional change, because institutional barriers often blocked the successful 
germination of new technologies. This is why they insisted that institutional change was 
a prerequisite for the adoption of new technologies imported from elsewhere. Not only 
was institutional change necessary for successful technoscientific agricultural change, 
but, in fact, institutional change had to come first. In my survey of the Green 
Revolution and technological diffusion literature it is Coward and Schutjer who made 
the first overt suggestion that the Green Revolution could be used as a social-scientific 
test case to examine their conjecture that institutional change was required as a 
precondition for the successful importation of new technologies, stating that “unless 
such difficulties are resolved through various intervention policies it may be impossible 
to sustain the initial technological changes.”59 Mexico, then, under Rockefeller 
management, was to become both a technoscientific and a social scientific laboratory, 
producing both agronomic and geopolitical changes exportable to other Southern 
hotspots where food insecurity might foment communist agitation. 
Coward went further three years later in his “Sociocultural Innovation and 
Developmental Change” when he described this diffusion strategy as resulting in a 
“‘social engineering’ strategy which also attempts to separate the tasks of innovation 
designing from innovation using.”60 In “The Green Revolution: Initiating and 
Sustaining Change” Coward and Schutjer established a framework for this kind of 
development sequence: “(1) significant technological change can be initiated with little 
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59 Coward and Schutjer, “The Green Revolution,” 473. 
60 E. Walter Coward, “Sociocultural Innovation and Developmental Change,” Philippine 
Sociological Review 21, no. 3-4 (Jul.-Oct. 1973), 239. 
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prior change in institutional patterns; but (2) this will have important influences on the 
pattern of participation in the development process; and (3) will require subsequent 
institutional changes if the development process is to be sustained.”61 The first principle 
of this framework was explained within the Achesonian “Limited Goods” paradigm of 
essential “peasant” innovativeness. Coward and Schutjer admitted that technological 
change could be initiated without significant institutional change because existing 
cultural structures were diverse enough to contain some individuals with access to 
credit, markets, and information, and in possession of large enough and therefore risk-
insulated holdings, concluding simply that these “[i]nstitutional patterns that create a 
skewed distribution of wealth, status and power plus new technology produce a 
productive but inequitable agricultural sector (emphasis mine).”62 Those few 
individuals in the community with the prerequisite resources for capital investment 
would disproportionately benefit from the initial technoscientific intervention before 
the eventual sociocultural institutional intervention could subsidize capital-strapped 
smaller-holder farmers. 
Coward and Schutjer touched upon all of the systematic economic and 
sociological approaches to the Green Revolution: they understood the co-production of 
technological and socio-cultural development packages; they insisted on the necessity 
of exogenous institutional change in technoscientific intervention; and they conceived 
of this institutional change in mechanistic terms as “social engineering.” They 
suggested that Green Revolution outcomes should be used as social-scientific case 
studies to better understand (and more effectively implement) technological 
interventions, and provided later economists and sociologists with an early warning 
sign of the increasingly apparent socio-economic inequalities of Green Revolution 
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interventions. Other economic and anthropological scholarship from the period built 
upon these themes, exemplifying the co-production of techno- and social-scientific 
labor in development interventions and highlighting the widening gap between Green 
Revolution promises and outcomes. 
 These debates about the interdependence and proper sequencing of 
institutional and technological intervention were brought directly to bear upon the 
Rockefeller Foundation Green Revolution program by V.W. Ruttan and Yujiro Hayami. 
Ruttan was a professor of agricultural economics and director of the Economic 
Development Center at the University of Minnesota; Hayami was an economics 
professor at Tokyo Metropolitan University. Their 1973 article, “Technology Transfer 
and Agricultural Development” was funded in part by the Rockefeller Foundation. 
Their work mirrored Coward and Schutjer’s model that technological transfer can occur 
initially without institutional change but will founder unless those institutional/cultural 
changes are soon made, but looked for a way to prevent that foundering from 
happening to the Rockefeller program in Mexico by elaborating three alternative paths 
to agricultural diffusion: material transfer, design transfer, capacity transfer. In 
agricultural cases the simple “material transfer” of seeds, inputs, and machinery proves 
to be a poor fit in the target locale. Those technologies were designed or bred to 
perform in a specific cultural and ecological context. In “design transfer” those 
technologies are reproduced as closely as possible from within the target locale, 
eliminating the cost of importation, but remaining as ill-adapted — they are still the 
same technologies developed for a different locale. The “capacity transfer” stage 
remedied all of these problems. Ruttan and Hayami touted the Rockefeller program in 
Mexico for attaining this stage of diffusion.63 
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 “Capacity transfer,” for Ruttan and Hayami, was the technical name of the 
process by which an external governmental or para-governmental entity links the 
importation of new technologies to a sweeping overhaul of knowledge-making 
institutions and mentalities in the target population. By “capacity transfer” Ruttan and 
Hayami specifically meant the transfer of scientists from the U.S. to Mexico and the 
subsequent establishment of an agricultural experiment station system, in effect, an 
institutional adjustment to the desired technologies urged by Mosher, and Coward and 
Schutjer. The plant geneticists, entomologists, and soil scientists the Rockefeller 
Foundation transplanted from the temperate U.S. to Mexico were sent to develop 
cultivars (and their associated ideal fertilizer, water, and biocide regimens) specifically 
adapted to Mexico.64 But for Ruttan and Hayami, capacity transfer was much more 
involved than the temporary loan of scientists. The ultimate aim of capacity transfer 
was to establish a Mexican system of agronomic education, research, and development. 
Institutionalization of Northern academic agronomic training models would occur first 
by sending young Mexicans to the United States to receive training from American 
universities and, upon returning, they were to reconfigure Mexican agronomic 
educational practices in the image of the American technoscientific agronomic 
curriculum. The institutional overhaul promulgated by the Rockefeller Foundation 
Mexican Agriculture Program likewise involved the expansion of extension agencies to 
connect the centralized elite schools of agronomy and Rockefeller experiment stations 
to Mexican farmers. These three institutional developments were mutually reinforcing 
and co-productive: the extension outposts and experiment stations incentivized the 
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reconfiguration of educational system by creating employment demand for technically-
trained professionals; the agricultural colleges helped the experiment and extension 
stations to identify prospective agronomists; the experiment stations provided practical 
training grounds and pre-packaged thesis projects for agricultural sciences students to 
perform for their degrees; the experiment stations generated new cultivars and input 
regimes to be communicated to the extension outpost; and the extension outposts 
liaised between the experiment stations and farmers.65 
These three institutional components and their synergistic reinforcement led 
Ruttan and Hayami to commend the Rockefeller agricultural program as “the evolution 
of an institutional pattern for the organization of scientific resources which can be 
replicated for a wide variety of crops and localities with a reasonable probability of 
success.”66 They considered this the “most important contribution” of the Rockefeller 
programs because  
It is now possible to organize a multidisciplinary team of biological, physical, and 
social scientists [trained by the agricultural universities] capable of adapting any 
new biological and chemical technology for crop production to local growing 
conditions [at experiment stations] and to make this technology available to 
farmers in a form that they are capable of accepting within the relatively short 
period of five to ten years [through extension outpost education outreach] 
(emphasis mine).67  
 
What Ruttan and Hayami revealed is that the Rockefeller endeavor in Mexico was not 
developed merely to gift agricultural technologies to Mexico. Its most important 
accomplishment was replacing the indigenous Mexican system of agricultural 
knowledge-making with a complex institutional apparatus for the maintenance of 
Northern technoscientific training, attitudes, and methods (re)produced by the 
mutually reinforcing university curricula, experiment stations, and extension outposts. 
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The Rockefeller program in Mexico indeed supplanted the extant Mexican knowledge-
cultivating apparatus with a Northern scientific knowledge-manufacturing and -
distributing apparatus, but the Rockefeller program resulted in a product that would 
extend far beyond its original boundaries. The Rockefeller Foundation had created a 
model for supplanting indigenous knowledge-cultivating apparatuses anywhere. This 
programmable model of epistemic colonialism was the real triumph Ruttan and 
Hayami saw in the Rockefeller operation in Mexico. 
 The “capacity transfer” process enacted by the Rockefeller Foundation in 
Mexico and described by Ruttan and Hayami elaborated a causal relationship between 
technoscientific intervention and the reconfiguration of the epistemic institutions and 
mentalities of the target population. It also revealed agriculture to be an especially 
suitable avenue for overhauling indigenous epistemologies. Unlike Latour’s immutable 
mobiles (mostly writings and mechanical experimental devices that read or work the 
same way almost anywhere) agricultural technologies are embedded within ecological 
and cultural localities — even the transferability of immaterial agricultural techniques is 
contingent upon ecological, climatic, and cultural conditions. For these reasons, for 
agricultural (or any biotechnological) intervention the “material transfer” and “design 
transfer” types of technoscientific intervention are inadequate. The successful transfer 
of agricultural technology requires the “capacity transfer” method of technological 
diffusion, necessitating a colonial intervention in the epistemic institutions and 
mentalities of the target population. 
  Among the development and diffusion theorists I surveyed, Ruttan and Hayami 
were the only ones to state outright the colonialist resonance of technological transfer. 
Although never with a critical approach, at three different points in their article they 
compared the institutional changes implemented under Rockefeller agro-development 
to colonial institutions with remarkably analogous mandates, placing both sets of 
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institutions within a shared lineage.68 They linked the diffusion process to the great 
colonial trading companies (drawing a silent but uncanny resemblance between those 
companies and the Cold War development NGOs and American agro-chemical 
companies supplying fertilizer, various biocides, and machinery). They contrasted the 
export-oriented cash crops incentivized by colonial governments to the staple-food 
promotions of later 20th-century development organizations (an important but not 
exculpatory distinction). And they made sure to highlight that the colonial institutions, 
likewise, established research centers under British, Dutch, and Belgian directives for 
the promotion of agricultural development. Understanding the ways in which neo-
colonial development projects incorporate or deviate from their traditional colonial 
inheritances presents promising, if a tad too far afield for this thesis, prospects for 
future research at the intersection of technoscience and state power. But Ruttan and 
Hayami are the only of the economic development and technological diffusion theorists 
surveyed here to make this analogy. While the anthropological theorists from the 
period take an altogether different approach, with less emphasis on the quantification 
of human decision-making and a noticeably keener awareness of the colonialist 
implications of social-scientific development work, the economists conducting case 
studies ignore any colonial implications of their work. 
Economic and Econometric Case Studies 
Perhaps commentary on the colonialist implications of development studies was 
outside the acceptable norms for economic case studies. In lock step they applied and 
elaborated the econometric approaches outlined above by Ruttan and Hayami; Coward 
and Schutjer; Katz, Levin, and Hamilton; and Mosher. William I. Jones, for example, 
was a lecturer at the Economic Development Institute, International Bank for 
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Reconstruction and Development when his “Mexico's Puebla Project: Is there Hope for 
the Minifundias?” was published.69 In it Jones attempted to synthesize various 
estimates of profitability and risk to farmers participating in Plan Puebla in Puebla 
State, and to proffer explanations for the differences between gains that had been 
promised (and touted to great effect on demonstration farms and by Plan Puebla’s 
information office) and the diminished results experienced instead by farmers trying 
out the prescribed fertilizer, water, plant density, and biocide recommendations. As a 
CIMMYT program, Plan Puebla was an outgrowth of the original Rockefeller Mexican 
Agriculture Program but with a significant difference. Whereas the original program 
had been predicated on the introduction of high-yielding-varieties (HYV) of seed, no 
effective HYV alternative could be developed by Rockefeller agronomists for Poblano 
maize. As Jones stated of the Poblano farmers, “[o]ver half knew about the maize 
hybrids developed by the Rockefeller program, but only 15% had tried them, and 
virtually all of these had found them wanting and abandoned them.” In short, they 
found no demonstrative increases in yield relative to the Poblano open-pollinated 
varieties. Jones agreed with this evaluation, stating that “not one of the hybrids 
developed and released there was sufficiently superior to the project area’s traditional 
varieties to warrant recommendation.”70 The failure to develop HYVs for the area 
instead led to the formulation of a new regimen involving higher seeding densities and 
the application of more and different mixtures of fertilizers.71  
                                                          
69 Minifundia, in the Latin American agricultural and land-policy context, refers, simply, to 
small farms, in contrast with the Spanish-colonial and pre-revolutionary (ca. 1910-20) 
latifundia economy of quasi-feudal haciendas. During the revolution, and in subsequent semi-
regular bursts of land confiscation and redistribution, the haciendas were allotted to small-
holder farmers and collectively-owned but usually individually-worked ejidal lands. 
70 William I. Jones, “Mexico’s Puebla Project: Is there Hope for the Minifundias?,” Ekistics 36, 
no. 217 (Dec. 1973), 395-96. 
71 Jones, “Mexico’s Puebla Project,” 396. 
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Put simply, Jones recognized that the failure of the Rockefeller program in 
Puebla was a technological failure not some cultural or intellectual deficiency of 
Poblano farmers. Much of Jones’s analysis hinged upon the calculation of estimated 
“cumulative benefit units,” an aggregate attempt to balance estimated gains against a 
calculated risk factor incorporating the availability of credit extended to farmers who 
experimented with Plan Puebla recommendations. Much less dry was Jones’s depiction 
of the Plan’s pitfalls. He noted the many detractors who raised the issue of the project 
having been started on a “short research base.” The term “short research base” was 
development shorthand for the fact that the Plan fertilizer, plant spacing, and other 
recommendations were based only on the results from test plots in 1968, which 
happened to be an abnormally good year for maize. The argument was that these 
aberrant results were used to create exaggerated expectations of yield increases 
supposed to follow from application of the prescribed regimen. Jones added three 
explanations of his own. These explanations, generated by an economist, were both 
derived from the agro-development technological intervention treated as a case study, 
and were themselves intended, through Jones’s reports to the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, to be reinfused into the next iteration of Plan Puebla 
prescriptions. 
First, through interviews conducted by Moscardi and Winkelmann, Jones 
identified risk-aversion as the overriding factor in Poblano farmer decision-making 
(although not without suggesting that farmers could be using risk-aversion as a pretext 
to mask some other more important factor that Jones does not feel compelled to 
explore). From this risk aversion Jones called attention to the fact that the creditors 
who provided upfront capital for the prescribed inputs (which only a very small 
percentage of farmers had the liquidity to purchase themselves in advance of the 
planting) were guaranteed by federal loan insurance. Debtor farmers, on the other 
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hand, were not guaranteed by the federal government “against famine and difficulty in 
getting future loans.”72 Second, Jones suggested that the profitability estimates were 
inflated or were calculated without accounting for enough variance in profitability 
among farmers. According to Jones, the planners miscalculated the opportunity cost of 
the increased farm labor required to implement the Plan Puebla regimen, an exercise 
that subtracted from the time farmers could devote to other income strategies such as 
laboring in the cities or for hire on other farms. In other words, Jones recognized Plan 
Puebla as a technological failure, but rather than attempt to understand Poblano 
resistance to the Plan recommendations in Poblano farmers’ own terms, he used 
Northern perspectives and categories to evaluate the new prescribed input regimens. 
Third, Jones tossed in the possibility of what he called “individual variance,” 
simply put, “[e]verywhere, different people respond to the same economic 
circumstances differently.”73 Echoing Kunkel’s flexible insistence on the idiosyncrasy of 
peasant microeconomic decision-making, though with much more almanack-like 
simplicity, with “individual variance” Jones opened the Pandora’s box of economic 
development studies. His explanation of “individual variance” conjured up a glaring 
cognitive dissonance, coming as it did on the heels of recommendations for changes in 
profitability-estimate procedures and federal crop insurance policy, and at the 
conclusion of an entire article concerned with evaluating aggregate risk analyses of 
“the” Poblano farmer. Until the very last sentence, Jones’s analysis was predicated on 
the assumption that it was possible for Plan Puebla planners to devise an optimal 
fertilizer, plant density, and irrigation regimen for all the farmers of Puebla State, and 
that a federal crop insurance policy could be devised to override the risk-aversion of 
financially tenuous small-holder farmers. Jones’s “Individual variance” undermines 
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universality. Through the case studies I will discuss this tension between the 
homogeneity required to make use of an econometric algorithm for centralized 
planning, on the one hand, and the infinite variability of microclimatic and ecological 
conditions and farmer’s opportunities, priorities, and constraints, on the other. 
Carlos Benito, at the time a professor of agricultural economics at the University 
of California Berkeley, in “Peasants' Response to Modernization Projects in 
‘Minifundia’ Economies” (1976) challenged the notion that labor-saving technologies 
would rapidly improve agricultural production. Like Jones above, Benito focused on 
Puebla and explained the low adoption rates of Plan Puebla recommendations largely 
through the examination of the opportunity costs of time and uncertainty. His study is 
immediately recognizable as a conscious application of the development/diffusion 
debates outlined above. He categorized contemporaneous debates into three 
components, one of which was the “fundamental behavioral rule of peasant families” 
both in general and under conditions of uncertainty.74 He proposed that “most” of these 
potential explanations of peasant microeconomic decision-making could be integrated 
into a choice model, the purpose of his article. Benito was also conscious of the 
concerns of the economic development and technological diffusion theorists, such as 
Mosher, Coward, Schutjer, Ruttan, and Hayami, that the development process 
dualistically be considered as separate but co-productive processes of technological and 
institutional intervention, which, he said, was likewise incorporated into his model. 
Benito described Plan Puebla as “one of the best-controlled experiments in 
modernization” that, after seven years of implementation, paradoxically found itself 
with relatively low rates of adoption. He stoked the exigency for social scientists to 
solve this “puzzle” by reminding them of the “high priority that various international 
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agencies and national agencies are giving today to modernization projects as a frontal 
attack on the world food problem.”75 Benito rose to the challenge of that puzzle by 
condemning “reduced-form models and one-modal explanations of adoption,” offering 
instead, “a structural form representation of the peasant household economy that could 
incorporate the various factors that explain adoption.” This formulation simultaneously 
demonstrated an awareness of the complexity of mathematizing the personality of an 
entire class of people, while at the same time lacking awareness of the dubiety of a 
reductive model to account for “various factors” rather than one.76 It is tempting when 
we study economics, or any scientific endeavor, with the aim of rendering its social 
construction visible, to take the choice cuts of interpersonal relations, institutional 
arrangements, and cultural presuppositions, and carefully avoid the jargony esoteric 
innards. With Benito’s econometric model of campesinx decision-making, I want to 
crack the lid of the black box, if only momentarily.77  In this case, because it is 
important, however prohibitively arcane these econometric models were, that we 
consider the formulae used to reduce peasant choice to command-and-controllable 
variables because mechanistic methods to understand complex organic phenomena 
were both what American scientists wanted to instill in Mexican agriculturalists and the 
means they used to fulfill this goal. 
 Benito’s “structural form representation of the peasant household economy” 
created variables for the total time of the peasant household and then allocated 
between time spent on agricultural activities and time spent on non-agricultural 
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working activities. The “agricultural time” consisted of actual farming, gathering 
information about modern agricultural practices (gathering information about 
endogenous agricultural practices was apparently irrelevant), and on organizational 
activities. The “non-agricultural working activities” were subdivided amongst crafts, 
trade, and working in the labor market. From here on, Benito concentrated on labor 
activities alone, apparently without considering the implications of excising from a 
model of peasant life their participation in craftwork and trade). “Feasible” agronomic 
practices were modeled using a stochastic production function designed to calculate 
expected agricultural production as a function of labor time, agro-inputs, services from 
physical capital, services from human capital, and weather. Feasible, as used here, is a 
euphemism for practices recommended by Northern agronomists or Mexican 
agronomists inculcated in the Northern agronomic mode. Also rife with soggy layers of 
meaning is the insertion of “services from human capital” (defined by Benito as 
“knowledge and information of agricultural practices”). Benito stated that the 
introduction of this factor into the model “transforms the technology into an 
endogenous variable” meaning “[l]ow levels” of this “human capital,” represented 
“knowledge (in some abstract units) of only ‘traditional’ practices, while high levels 
indicate knowledge of ‘modern’ practices.”78 Uncovering the fundamental 
presuppositions of this stochastic “structural form representation of the peasant 
household economy” and others like it presents intriguing research opportunities with 
the potential to generate new kinds of questions for those working under post- and 
anti-colonial philosophies of history. As much profitable work could be done 
demystifying what it means, conceptually, to apply a stochastic function to the choices 
of a person or a group people. 
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 Having elucidated this “structural form representation of the peasant household 
economy,”this model could be condensed into “a linear programming version in which 
risk, uncertainty, and information are incorporated by means of a safety-first rule,” so 
that, “by means of plausible assumptions and simplifications, an otherwise dynamic 
and nonlinear model is transformed into a simpler linear model so that the linear 
programming algorithm may be used to obtain solutions.”79 What made these 
assumptions plausible was the acceptance as fact that yields from “traditional” and 
“modern” farming practices were closely related. This close relation consisted of three 
factors: they were to be applied under the same ecological conditions; that the 
empirical model represented the “average” campesinx household in Puebla State; and 
that the campesinx farmers grew only maize. 
Using the linear programming algorithm, Benito applied the model to data from 
CIMMYT reports based on interviews in order to explain the low adoption rates by 
small farmers of the Plan Puebla recommendations. The process suffices to explain the 
econometric approach to modeling and optimizing peasant decision-making: first 
create a structural model of the peasant household economy based on assumptions 
about farmers’ priorities, possibilities, and aptitudes (and based on assumptions, taken 
from Northern microeconomic understanding of leisure, labor, time, profit, and 
investment, about what is relevant or ignorable in a model microeconomy). The 
endpoint of the linear programming algorithm was the  determination of a set of 
possible feasible solutions.80 The model’s results were then to be applied by 
econometricians to campesinx household study subjects by plugging in data collected 
about them by CIMMYT. 
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This process constituted a subroutine of the development program in two 
senses. First as an organizational project and, as it can mean in computer science, a 
recursive algorithm to optimize the results of that project. The output from this 
econometric peasant decision-making model-generating subroutine would be plugged 
back into to the CIMMYT planners of the Puebla Project, with the variables responsible 
for the suboptimal results (fertilizer, plant density, water, biocide application, timing 
schedule, credit requirements, interest rates, etc.) tweaked and published as a new set 
of recommendations. By executing this formula Benito asserted that “Economists can 
provide valuable assistance in the design and evaluation of these type of programs if 
their research is grounded on a model of political economy that takes into account the 
overall opportunity set of peasant households within each specific socioeconomic 
structure and a structural form model of the allocation of human time at the household 
level.”81 Benito’s econometric model, as a social scientific intervention, was just one 
such way social scientific studies co-produced the Green Revolution in Mexico 
alongside technoscientific interventions. It also represents an instance in which 
Northern epistemological attitudes and practices like assumptions and models of 
campesinx behavior were both the transformation development economists sought to 
induce in Mexican knowledge-making and the means to enact that transformation.  
Building off of Benito’s work, and, actually, helping to build it as Benito 
acknowledged his indebtedness to both of them for many of the ideas in his article, 
Edgardo Moscardi and Alain de Janvry sought to explain the relationship between 
campesinx attitudes and agricultural technological diffusion. The premise and 
approach of their 1977 article “Attitudes Toward Risk among Peasants: An Econometric 
Approach” should sound familiar, as they outlined in the article’s abstract:  
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Attitudes toward risk among peasants in Puebla, Mexico, are derived from survey 
data in a model of safety-first behavior. The measurements of behavior toward 
risk obtained are then explained by a set of socioeconomic and structural 
variables that characterize peasant households. Knowledge of the determinants 
of attitudes toward risk is, in turn, useful for the purpose of tailoring 
technological recommendations to particular categories of peasants.82 
 
With much more explicit intentionality than Benito, Moscardi and de Janvry’s article 
was intended to promote the integration of social scientific analyses of agro-
development in Mexico and Rockefeller development policy through Plan Puebla. This 
was quite literally the case: like Benito, de Janvry was a professor of agricultural and 
resource economics at the University of California Berkeley, while Moscardi was an 
economist at the Rockefeller-backed CIMMYT in Mexico. The purpose of their 
collaboration was to “identify the specific determinants of behavior toward risk and to 
quantify their impact on decision making,” making it possible “to determine packages 
of technological and institutional practices optimally tailored to peasants’ economic 
behavior. Such packages should greatly enhance the chances of success of rural 
development programs.”83 As was true of Benito, Moscardi and de Janvry did not ask 
campesinxs what factors were relevant to the economic maintenance of their 
households, nor attempted to ascertain campesinxs’ personal priorities: they assumed 
them. 
Their model of the campesinx household economy was, however, altogether 
more limited in scope than Benito’s.84  The question of cognitive capacity was 
central.“Learning” (as with Benito’s “human capital increases”) was defined by 
Northern-centric assumptions about how to characterize this variable (recall that 
                                                          
82 Edgardo Moscardi and Alain de Janvry, “Attitudes Toward Risk among Peasants: An 
Econometric Approach,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 59, no. 4 (Nov. 1977), 
710. 
83 Moscardi and de Janvry, “Attitudes toward Risk among Peasants,” 710,715-16. 
84 They broke down their model into three categories of variables:  the “nature” of the 
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Benito encoded “traditional” practices as a low level of human capital). Moscardi and 
de Janvry’s presuppositions about campesinx knowledge and technique acquisition, 
illustratively, are worth reproducing in full: 
Age and years of schooling of the household head and family size are included in 
the first class of variables. It is generally assumed that, other factors being the 
same, older farmers tend to be less prone to take risks than younger ones. This 
should be particularly true in subsistence agriculture where age can hardly imply 
greater on-the-job experience (which may be thought to be positively associated 
with risk bearing), since, on the one hand, the ability to farm under these 
conditions does not require a lot of experience and, on the other, opportunities 
to develop informally new types of skills and to use them profitably are not easily 
available (emphasis mine).85 
 
Moscardi and de Janvry explicitly stated that their evaluation of the risk aversion of 
campesinxs, the sole aim of their study, was predicated upon these assumptions. These 
assumptions were often rooted in the false conflation of technological sophistication 
and cultural or intellectual sophistication of the kind so thoroughly demonstrated by 
Michael Adas in his Machines as the Measure of Man. More illuminatingly, these 
assumptions reveal the underlying argumentative utility of “risk-aversion”: speaking of 
campesinx behavior in terms of risk, and modeling economic analyses around the 
presuppositions about the primacy of the risk-aversion attitude, served to target 
campesinx traditionalism as the reason for the failure of an attempted technological 
diffusion. 
Benito’s and Moscardi and de Janvry’s articles exemplified the econometric 
model of peasant decision-making and simultaneously placed the onus of diffusion 
failure on campesinx communities while locating the agency of correcting this “risk-
aversion” in the hands of development institutions. Alternatively, Robert V. Burke 
sought to determine whether responsibility for the low adoption rates of Plan Puebla 
inhered in the technology itself. Burke used the 1970 Censos Agricola-Ganadero y 
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Ejidal (Agricultural/Livestock Ejidal Census) to answer this question in his article 
“Green Revolution Technologies and Farm Class in Mexico”. At the time Burke was an 
employee of the U.S. Treasury Department; it is unclear whether this work was related 
to his role at the Treasury, as it was an extension of his Ph.D. research. The 1970 
Censos Agricola recorded municipio-level data for all but four of the Mexican states: 
Michoacan, Veracruz, Oaxaca, and Chiapas.86 Significantly, these states contain 
significant indigenous populations.87  
Burke was investigating, through regression analyses, the supposed neutrality, 
with regard to scale, of the biological and chemical technologies (seeds, fertilizers, and 
biocides) of the Green Revolution. This presumed neutrality was rooted in their 
materiality, namely in the near infinite divisibility of these inputs.88 A farmer could 
plant one hectare of HYV seed, add one hectare’s worth of fertilizer, pesticide, 
herbicide, and fungicide, and it would, according to this logic, produce the same yield 
as a well endowed farmer planting fifty hectares. In contrast, one could not similarly 
subdivide a thresher, harrow, or tractor. Using fertilizer application as a benchmark to 
which other elements of Plan Puebla were pegged, Burke, however, found significant 
differences between the fertilizer coefficients of large private farms on the one hand, 
and small private farms and ejidos, on the other. He attributed this finding to the 
contrasting capital intensivity of the large private farms and the land intensivity of the 
small private farms and ejidos. This was especially problematic because the explicit 
mission of Plan Puebla was “to . . . obtain a massive increase in yields of a basic food 
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crop among smallholder farmers — those who are usually the last to adopt new 
technology.”89 
 All of the economic cases studies presented here, from 1973 to 1979, appear to 
approach the diffusion failure of agricultural technologies at the point of consumption. 
Their analyses all attempted to understand the failure of Green Revolution programs in 
the hands of farmers, rather than investigate the social dynamics of the agricultural 
extension agency or the research station. This apparent focus on the farmer allowed 
Jones, Benito, Moscardi, and De Janvy to situate the locus of responsibility, and blame, 
for the adoption failure of Green Revolution technologies on campesinx farmers. Only 
Burke considered that the locus of responsibility could lie with the false scale-neutrality 
of the technologies themselves, and he only began to suggest this possibility by 
studying adoption failure in the campesinx community; he did not follow this 
investigation back to the design process of these technologies. But these studies only 
appear to produce their analyses from the consumption junction. Jones’s conclusions 
were drawn from CIMMYT reports of adoption failure and interviews conducted by 
Winkelmann and Moscardi; Benito’s and Moscardi and De Janvry’s econometric 
models were run with data gleaned from CIMMYT reports; Burke’s analysis was based 
on data from the 1970 Censos Agricola-Ganadero y Ejidal. None of these studies 
attempted to elicit the decision-making criteria from campesinx farmers themselves. 
These analyses were only positioned at the consumption junction through various 
intermediary studies. Furthermore, none of these economic case studies attempted to 
scrutinize the technological development process from the perspective of the 
consumer. Jones’s analysis was presented from the perspective of other development 
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economists. Benito’s and Moscardi and De Janvry’s models were predicated on 
standard assumptions from growth and development economics like profit-
maximization and risk-abatement, and not on priorities ascertained from campesinx 
farmers themselves. Although unintentionally, Jones’s third explanation for adoption 
failure, “individual variance,” suggested a much more pervasive impediment to 
development economics. His anti-generalizing generalization, “everywhere, different 
people respond to the same economic circumstances differently,” unwittingly provided 
an impetus to eschew rationalizing and totalizing assumptions about decision-making 
behavior derived from the perspective of Northern capitalist household priorities, and 
instead to base explanations of campesinx farmer decisions on the farmers’ own 
priorities and values ascertained from intimate contact with farming communities and 
farmers themselves. 
Ethnographic Field Studies 
Social Scientists trained to use ethnographic practices and refocus their 
research gaze to empathize with the perspective of their study subjects were primely 
positioned to study the adoption failure of Green Revolution technologies at the point 
of consumption, both physically and analytically, and to see the technological 
production and diffusion process from the vantage point of the campesinx farmer. For 
example, whereas Robert Burke sought only to demonstrate the adoption failure of 
Plan Puebla and suggested that failure be attached to the misunderstood neutrality of 
the Green Revolution technologies, David Clawson and Don Hoy went further and 
determined to explain why a specific community rejected the Green Revolution. 
Their “Nealtican, Mexico: A Peasant Community That Rejected the 'Green 
Revolution'” was unique in economics journals in that it attempted to uncover the 
Nealticanos’ own logics for rejecting the HYV seeds, rather than simply ascribe that 
failure to miscalculated incentives, insurance rates, promised yields, or input 
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recommendations — in other words, they upheld the agency of the Mexican small-
holder farmers they studied, rather than assuming the farmers to be econometrically 
codifiable and economically “rational” and therefore reducible to manipulable 
variables. Clawson and Hoy challenged the fundamental assumption, common among 
Northerners, that the innovations promoted in the Green Revolution would be 
beneficial to farmers. Theirs is the only field study in Mexico published in an economics 
journal I have found that challenged this most basic presupposition of the Green 
Revolution: “[t]his somewhat ethnocentric attitude,” Clawson and Hoy contend, 
“implies a belief that the farmers who have rejected the Green Revolution have been 
unable to recognize what is best for them,” harkening back to debates about campesinx 
innovativeness.90 To that end, Clawson and Hoy identified six factors important to 
Nealticanos in their decision not to use HYV seeds: (1) the small kernel count per cob; 
(2) the drastically shorter stalk of the dwarf varieties of maize; (3) the susceptibility of 
the hybrids to corn worm infestation; (4) the season-to-season degeneration of hybrid 
maize yields necessitating frequent purchases of new seed stock; (5) the disagreeable 
taste and texture of the hybrids; and (6) the regimentation of the planting and 
harvesting schedule for HYVs, and monoculture in general. I will investigate some of 
these reasons, and issues Nealticanos took with other components of Plan Puebla in 
greater detail. It must be kept in mind, though, that some of these factors were part of 
development agents’ prescriptions and were variables in economists’ models. The 
point, for Clawson and Hoy, however, is that these concerns were based on the 
testimony of the farmers themselves and not by presumption. Clawson and Hoy’s 
insistence on this matter also enabled them to identify decision-making factors of 
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importance to local farmers that were ignored altogether by development agents and 
economists. Their approach exposed the assumptions of these agents and, in the 
process, interrogated the universality of the Northern scheme for understanding 
productivity, labor, profit, and the value of time. 
 The drastically shorter stock of the dwarf varieties was considered by 
Rockefeller agronomists to be the paramount innovation of HYV seeds. The Green 
Revolution plan, from the perspective of plant genetics, was to increase yield by 
increasing the receptiveness of the plant to fertilizer; the shorter stalk made this 
possible in two ways: that more of the nutrients provided by the fertilizer were 
converted into grain and there was a decreased likelihood that the plant, top heavy 
from the enlarged cobs, would topple over. Taken purely from the priorities of 
Rockefeller plant geneticists, the short-stalked dwarf varieties were essential to 
unlocking the potential of synthetic fertilizer. From the perspective of Nealtican 
farmers, however, who used corn stalks to feed their animals through the arid winter, 
the dwarf varieties either created a new source of food insecurity or forced them to 
purchase animal feed. Likewise, the HYV susceptibility to corn worm infestation forced 
the Nealticano farmers to purchase insecticides. The degeneration of the seed stock 
after only two or three years forced them to frequently purchase new seed. With open-
pollinated local maize cultivars, a portion of seed withheld from the previous harvest 
could be planted with no degeneration in yield because the open-pollinated varieties 
maintained their rigor by cross-pollinating with other nearby cultivars. Although 
completely ignored by economists and development planners concerned only with the 
yield and the maintenance of essential nutrients (mostly for caloric value), the taste and 
texture of the corn was also of great importance to Nealticano farmers. Subsistence and 
near subsistence farmers in Mexico depended on maize as their staple — they ate it at 
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every meal and it constituted the majority of their caloric intake — and its palatability 
was therefore of great importance.91   
 The sixth reason Nealticanos rejected the HYV seeds, and the one Clawson and 
Hoy insisted was of the most critical to their informants, was the regimentation of the 
HYV planting and harvesting cycle. To understand its importance one must understand 
the staggered polyculture system developed and sustained by Mexican campesinxs over 
the centuries. This system was flexibly adaptive to seasonal climatic and insect-
population flux and was co-produced with agricultural seasonality and Mexican 
campesinx lifeways synced with religious and cosmological calendrical cyclicality. In 
these regards, Nealtican disaffection with the HYV planting and harvesting schedule 
serves to highlight the chasm between Northern agronomic priorities, approaches to 
the value of human labor, the meaning of security, and the linear conception of time, on 
the one hand, and the indigenous and mestizo campesinx Mexican alternatives, on the 
other, underscoring the hostility of the Northern technoscientific development regime 
to campesinx lifeways. Ancestrally, Nealticans had selected for and cultivated four 
strains of maize, identifiable by color: yellow, white, blue, and red. Each had different 
cob weights, yields, ideal planting dates, and gestation periods. 
Yellow was the heaviest, had the highest yield, and took the longest to mature, 
followed by white, blue, and red. Although these variances in yield, planting date, 
weight, and gestation period do not lend multicolored maize polyculture to the 
standardization ideal for industrial monoculture, they do make possible a system of 
crop insurance and dietary variance. The industrial capitalist approach to maize 
farming in Nealtican would probably have privileged the yellow variety, as it excelled in 
yield — the supreme Northern crop virtue — but, in actuality, the Nealticanos surveyed 
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by Clawson and Hoy disliked its taste and considered it only fit for animal feed. For 
human consumption, Nealticanos planted white maize approximately six months 
before the expected first frost in September; two weeks later, in the event of a less than 
desirable sprouting of the white maize stalks, blue maize was planted; finally, two 
weeks later, again as needed, red maize was sown. With this four-cultivar system, the 
Nealticanos afforded themselves a month of meteorological flexibility to ensure that a 
robust crop was planted. Moreover, their cultivars were resistant to corn worm and the 
polyculture prevented any one blight or pest from decimating their whole crop; and 
between the yellow corn and the tall stalks of all four cultivars, they had animal fodder 
throughout the dry winter season.92 
 Measuredly taking this in, and noticing the compatibility of the Nealticano’s 
agricultural system with their specific ecological conditions, aesthetic preferences, and 
conceptions of leisure, labor, and security, Clawson and Hoy recommended that “rather 
than endeavoring to change the peasant to be compatible with the Green Revolution, 
we can attempt to modify the Green Revolution products to be compatible with the 
peasant’s world.”93 As for the incompatibility of the HYVs to the Poblano environment 
and the Plan Puebla system of dividing all of Puebla State into “cold,” “hot,” and 
“temperate” zones (Nealticanos were “temperate, apparently), which “resulted in a 
program not adapted to any single village,” Clawson and Hoy had this to say: 
Such a course of action will require an increased emphasis on and recognition of 
the environmental diversity that characterizes the world of potential Green 
Revolution adopters. One promising method of achieving this is the ecological 
systems approach which stresses the integration of physical and social 
phenomena rather than the study of a problem from the viewpoint of a single 
discipline. . . . Our challenge now is to . . . adapt the Green Revolution to the 
location-specific needs of the small farmer. This will be more difficult and slower 
than the initial gains among large landholders.94 
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The tension, recognized by Jones above, between the homogeneity necessary for 
algorithmic calculation and centralized planning on the one hand, and the infinite 
variability of microclimatic, ecological, and cultural conditions and farmer’s 
opportunities, priorities, and constraints on the other, if only alluded to in Jones’s, 
Benito’s, and Moscardi and de Janvry’s articles, became unavoidable in Clawson and 
Hoy’s. Neither Benito’s nor Moscardi and de Janvry’s models factored in whether 
Poblano farmers liked the taste of HYVs or whether they were integratable with a 
Poblano community’s system of animal husbandry. The issue of security was resolved 
by crop insurance that did not cover their losses, did not provide them with seed for 
next year’s planting, and that by and large they could not afford. Clawson and Hoy thus 
challenged the fundamental premises of Rockefeller agents, diffusion theorists, and 
development economists. 
Clawson and Hoy did not, however, question exogenous development itself. The 
“challenge” they referred to in the above excerpt, and the first person plural pronoun 
they used to involve themselves and their work in that challenge, places them under the 
umbrella of social science in the service of development. Perhaps a reason that Clawson 
and Hoy’s methodological approach and conclusions are such a radical departure, 
though, from those of Benito and Moscardi & de Janvry, despite appearing in the 
annals of the American Journal of Economics and Sociology, was that Clawson and 
Hoy were trained as geographers, not economists. Their attitude will appear much 
more comfortable in the company of the anthropologists. 
 The anthropologists examined here were aware of the hazardous implications of 
academic colonialism and were often critically self-conscious of the power asymmetry 
between themselves and their study subjects. But like the geographers Clawson and 
Hoy, not all anthropologists saw their work as external to and in conflict with the goals 
of the Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico. Christina H. Gladwin, for example, was 
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employed at the International Fertilizer Development Center, an outgrowth of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority and sponsored by USAID, between 1976 and 1979. 
Although Gladwin operated as an economic anthropologist employed in the 
development industry, she was overtly antagonistic to the econometric framework. In 
“Production Functions and Decision Models: Complementary Models” she questioned 
the very nature of econometric approaches to decision-making by undermining the 
“maximization assumption.” The econometric studies described above all assumed 
campesinxs maximize profit and minimize risk (the “safety-first rule”), or do one or 
both of those two things while accounting for some small set of constraints. 
Problematically, as Gladwin incisively pointed out, standard econometric evaluation 
merely “tests the maximization assumption itself and does not test models of farmers’ 
actual decisions.”95 Further degrading the foundational premises of these econometric 
models, Gladwin argued that their behavioral assumptions and the few constraints they 
incorporated were drastically too simple to account for the logics of decision-making 
she uncovered in her interviews. To ameliorate the deficiencies of the production 
function models and the maximization behavioral assumption upon which they were 
based, Gladwin proposed an alternative model-making process: the decision tree. 
 Her decision tree model, applied to an unspecified village targeted by Plan 
Puebla, showed that “an understanding of the logic behind the production decisions 
that comprise the traditional way, rather than just surveys gathering data on 
socioeconomic status and facts about production, is necessary for a successful rural 
development project.” Such observations directly challenged econometric analyses (she 
pointed to Moscardi by name). Like Clawson and Hoy, she emphasized the importance 
of the internal cultural logics of those she studied, rather than presuming that they 
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operated under the same priorities and economic motives as the Northern consumers 
on whom microeconomic models were originally trained — that is she evaluated 
Mexican farmers’ decisions according to their epistemic frameworks, not her own.96 
How Gladwin’s decision tree models were generated is best shown anecdotally. 
She began by identifying farmers who applied differential methodological decisions on 
different parcels of their land — fertilizing, planting, or irrigating one parcel differently 
from another — so that she could ask, “Why did you do this in X but that in Y?” She 
found a farmer who made the decision to fertilize some of his fields at planting time, 
while leaving some of his recently sown corn unfertilized until the corn had sprouted. 
He responded that he only fertilized at planting if the earth was very moist, so that the 
fertilizer could dissolve into the soil (a prerequisite for fertilizer uptake). Gladwin 
reconfigured his response into a possible decision criterion and tested it by asking, “Do 
you think it would be dangerous for the plants if you threw fertilizer at planting, even 
though the earth is moist?” on her questionnaire to other farmers.97 She conceived of 
the farmer’s choice to only fertilize if the soil was moist as an instance of risk-aversion, 
which is why she framed the question as “would it be dangerous . . .?” “Unfortunately” 
Gladwin stated, this decision-criterion did not “predict” what the farmer would do, as 
he had already not done it. By “predict” she meant that he answered her question “no”. 
As with the first farmer, she asked him why it was that he did not fertilize at planting 
and the farmer responded that he  
did not have irrigation like the previous farmer, and the humidity of nonirrigated 
land after rain in April (planting time) was not like the humidity of land after 
irrigation so that the fertilizer would not dissolve if it was thrown on nonirrigated 
land after a rain in April. While he did not think it was dangerous for the seed in 
the ground to have undissolved fertilizer sitting on top of the ground, he did not 
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think that the possibility of the plants’ drying out later if the rains stopped was 
greater for plants with fertilizer than for plants without fertilizer.98 
 
In light of this response, she reconceptualized the criterion from one of risk-aversion 
into a utility criterion. The second farmer found that his soil-moisture level, maintained 
only precariously by rain, was inadequate for properly dissolving fertilizer into the soil; 
he did not believe it damaged the plants if left on the soil surface, only that it was totally 
ineffective, and so he waited for more rain before fertilizing. 
In this recursive fashion, eliciting responses from farmers through interviews, 
crafting possible decision-making criteria from them, testing those criteria by posing 
them to other farmers, and reformulating the potential criteria in light of their 
responses and so on, Gladwin constructed her decision tree model. Simply by asking 
farmers to explain their decisions in their terms went well beyond the assumptions of 
previous econometric analyses; more importantly still, she did not allow her initial 
interpretation of the initial round of interviews (in this case that the decision not to 
fertilize was an act of risk-aversion) to suffice for her model, reiteratively testing her 
interpretations against the testimony of other farmers. 
After she felt that the decision criteria corresponded with the interviewed subset 
(25 responses) of farmers’ decisions, the next step was to “[use] the language and 
categories that the decision makers themselves use [to] put the decision criteria into a 
flowchart,” and to make sure that the flowchart was “descriptively adequate” by testing 
it against the decisions made by the subset of interviewed farmers from whom the 
decision criteria were originally derived.99 At this point in the model-building process, 
agency had been placed firmly in the hands of the community Gladwin studied. The 
next step, however, warrants closer inspection. At this point, Gladwin translated the 
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tree constructed with the farmers’ own words using an “economic interpretation” to 
“find the underlying ordering aspect and constraints of the theory. Depending on what 
the flowchart says, the alternatives can be ordered on any aspect: profit, cost, risk, 
welfare of the group, etc.”100 She then tested the model against the adoption decisions 
of a second subset of farmers (34 responses). One of the trees’ results looks like this:101 
 
The unintelligible formula at the top level of this tree was a profitability criterion asking 
if the value of the marginal product of fertilizer is at least two times its marginal cost or 
price. “Error” in this case was not a judgment of the farmers’ decisions, but of the 
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model; it meant that the farmer in question made the set of decisions leading to that 
leaf of the tree, but either increased their fertilizer use (the adoption decision for this 
tree) when the farmers from whose interviews the tree was crafted did not, or the 
inverse (these end results are contained in rectangles). 
Gladwin’s decision tree model was intended to understand farmers’ own 
reasons for non-adoption whereas Benito’s and Moscardi & de Janvry’s models tested 
the (maximization and minimization) assumptions they made about farmers, as 
Gladwin pointed out. However, because Gladwin reformulated the model in terms of 
economic constraints (profit, risk, capital, and knowledge) as she understood them 
before testing the model, she could as well have accused her own model of testing her 
conceptions of these constraints. For example, her ethnographic work did not attempt 
to ascertain the importance that the farmers placed on profit relative to food security or 
of their attitudes to accruing capital. Gladwin’s knowledge constraints — her rewording 
of the farmers’ responses into the language of the agronomic planners— treated 
“knowledge” as synonymous with exposure to Plan Puebla recommendations, and did 
not include access to knowledge of alternative techniques or input regimens, or access 
to information critical of, and countervailing to, Plan Puebla recommendations. 
Although she frequently reminded readers that “[t]he two aims of a decision study 
should be to identify decision factors amenable to policy variation and to recommend 
changes that will speed up adoption of a project’s recommendations,” she failed to self-
critically consider the conflict of interest between the mission-oriented objective she 
brought to the village and that she shared with her employer, and what she considered 
to be the “successful” path through the decision tree (the left-most path). As she put it, 
“The problem of statistical significance of each path on a tree can be thought of as a 
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quality-control problem: the farmers are passing through quality criteria designed to 
weed out the noninnovators.”102 
 Gladwin undermined some of the basic presuppositions of development-
oriented econometric analysis and was forcefully critical of the behavioral assumptions 
built into Benito’s and Moscardi & de Janvry’s models. As an economic anthropologist, 
she introduced innovations into the pragmatics of development economics field work, 
but she did not alter the basic routine concerning the relationship between the 
technoscientific intervention and social scientific intervention components of a 
development regime. A development program was utilized as a case study; Gladwin 
collected data from the campesinxs affected by that case study; she created a model of 
campesinx behavior (although not one predicated on assumptions about that 
behavior); and she tested her model against campesinx behavior so that the results 
could be used to tweak the next iteration of that technoscientific intervention package. 
Even though her work mapped directly onto this pattern, she proposed another 
innovation in the social-scientific intervention subroutine by suggesting that decision 
trees be employed at an earlier stage of the technological intervention subroutine, just 
after the (“limited release”) pretest but before the intervention to the subject 
population at large, arguing for a more intricately enmeshed interdependency between 
the technological and social-scientific intervention subroutines “with the aim of 
speeding up the diffusion process.”103 
 Gladwin set out to challenge the foundational assumptions of econometric 
modeling in agro-development but did so in order to quicken the pace of 
technoscientific intervention. In other words, she changed the rules but not the game. 
Billie DeWalt, an anthropologist at the University of Kentucky, went further by 
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challenging the very notions of induced “modernization” and “development” in 
Mexican agriculture, criticizing the ethnocentrism of those terms. In his 1979 
“Alternative Adaptive Strategies in a Mexican Ejido: A New Perspective on 
Modernization and Development,” he argued that technological change should instead 
be viewed as an adaptive process. The ethnocentrism of “development” and 
“modernization” became all too apparent to DeWalt in his interviews of development 
agents in the Temascalcingo region when the agents attributed the failure of their 
development projects to campesinxs whom they described as “uncooperative, 
apathetic, drunkards, suspicious, resistant to change, and lazy.”104 DeWalt placed his 
critique in the context of a two pronged assault against contemporaneous conceptions 
of modernization and development. One the one hand, criticism was coming from those 
beginning to realize that tradition and modernity were not simply two termini of a 
dipole. The other critique, also made in the anthropological overviews of the Green 
Revolution in the following section, was that “our energy-intensive, high-technology 
way of life may be coming to an end,” and that Southern countries did not have to, and 
perhaps even could not, follow the Northern path traced by industrialization toward 
global capitalism.105 DeWalt argued that change in “peasant” society should be 
reconstrued in biomimetic-metaphoric terms as an evolutionary adaptive process.106 
What he found through his ethnographic work was that when campesinxs were 
presented with an agro-technological package, they neither rejected nor accepted the 
package of inputs, seeds, and techniques wholecloth. Nor were they integrating subsets 
of the package at random. Their adoption choices were intentional and backed by 
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internally consistent cultural logics.107 More importantly still, his campesinx 
informants did not categorize the technologies they used in terms of “traditional” and 
“modern.” For DeWalt, this reframed this dichotomy as an artifact of development 
theorists and agents as much as an imposition of the technological package itself.108 
Instead, DeWalt’s campesinx informants saw the subset of the package as simply an 
added component of their cultural repertoire, “their major means of coping with the 
natural and social environment in which they live.” In doing so, they created a synthesis 
of endogenous and induced exogenous techniques and technologies that allowed 
DeWalt to “detect patterns in the ways in which these elements are combined,” and 
thus “talk of adaptive strategies.”109 
 To that aim, DeWalt performed a factor analysis to look for patterns in the 
adoption decisions of the campesinxs living in the municipio of Temascalcingo on 
ejidal land. He found that their adoption choices were not random, but that the 
Temascalcingan campesinxs were concentrating their investments in those subsets of 
the intervention package with the potential for synergistic effects, concluding that “an 
individual’s choice of strategies depended on a complex decision-making process and 
that the strategies adopted were found to be understandable when ecological, 
economic, political, social, and other variables were taken into account.”110 Extending 
his biomimetic metaphor of adaptation, DeWalt considered this piece-meal adoption of 
subsets of technological packages to be “evolutionary”, rather than (Green) 
“revolutionary” adoption. Campesinx decisions were instead a kind of risk-abatement 
through cautious experimentation. As a result, DeWalt protested against what he 
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viewed as the attempt by development agents to “strive to convert a region to any single 
adaptive strategy.”111 Playing up the biomimetic metaphor, DeWalt considered this 
overspecialization to be as dangerous to cultural evolution as it was to biological 
evolution, instead seeking rigor through intercultural hybridity. After establishing this 
“adaptation” alternative that campesinxs were already comfortably engaged with on 
their own terms, DeWalt, as did other social-scientists of this era, once again 
subordinated his analysis to the purposes of agro-development agents. He proposed 
ways for agro-development agents to adopt the adaptation-oriented mentality, use 
factor analysis to understand those adaptations, and to vertically integrate that kind of 
analysis into their technological-intervention workflow. Agents who saw their charges 
employing adaptive strategies they predicted would be unsuccessful were to be 
encouraged to demonstrate alternatives, withhold credit, or “provid[e] them only 
minimal assistance.”112 
Clawson, Hoy, Gladwin, and DeWalt conducted their studies at the point of 
consumption. They were in direct contact with the campesinx farmers they studied. 
Furthermore, they attempted to scrutinize the shortcomings of the Green Revolution 
technoscientific intervention from the perspective of their campesinx informants using 
their informants’ epistemic outlooks. For these reasons, I read Clawson, Hoy, Gladwin 
and DeWalt through the lens of Ruth Schwartz Cowan’s analytical framework: “the 
consumption junction” for technology studies. To be clear, I do not here deploy the 
consumption junction as the methodological approach of this thesis — I do not study 
the consumers of Green Revolution technologies in Mexico — but instead study those 
social scientists studying the consumers. Rather, I am suggesting that over the course 
of the 1970s, social scientists studying agricultural technological diffusion in Mexico 
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began to methodologically develop some tenets of technoscientific studies like those 
Schwartz Cowan made explicit at the beginning of the 1980s. Schwartz Cowan first 
began to lay out the parameters of her methodological approach to technology studies 
at the consumption junction in her pivotal 1983 book More Work for Mother, but also 
provided a succinct overview of its functions, capacities, and limitations in a 1987 book 
chapter, “The Consumption Junction: A Proposal for Research Strategies in the 
Sociology of Technology.”113 
Schwartz Cowan saw the consumption junction as the interface at which place 
and time the consumer makes an adoption (non)decision. This consumer was 
conceived of as embedded in a network of social relations that constrain and direct the 
consumer’s choices, including technological adoption choices. Schwartz Cowan argued 
that the network of relations woven between producer and consumer through various 
intermediaries in the technological diffusion flow should be inverted: rather than 
studying the relational matrix of a technology with the site of production at the 
epicenter and the consumer at the periphery, technology studies scholars should 
reenvision the network with the consumer at the center. Moreso, the scholar of 
technological diffusion should position their study at this interface (the consumption 
junction) and turn the critical gaze of their study outward, back upon the rest of the 
network from the vantage point of the consumer. Traditional studies of the Green 
Revolution in Mexico concerning themselves with the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture 
and the Rockefeller Foundation conceived of the network with the technoscientific and 
                                                          
113 Ruth Schwartz Cowan, More Work for Mother: The Ironies of Household Technology from 
the Open Hearth to the Microwave (New York: Basic Books, 1983). 
    Ruth Schwartz Cowan, “The Consumption Junction: A Proposal for Research Strategies in the 
Sociology of Technology,” in The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions 
in the Sociology and History of Technology, eds. Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, Trevor 
Pinch (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 261-280. 
68 
 
technocratic elites at the center.114 The case studies in economics detailed above (Jones, 
Benito, Moscardi, De Janvry, and Burke) did position themselves at the consumption 
junction (but only through intermediaries), but they scrutinized the decisions of 
campesinx farmers from the perspective of (and with the same objectives as) the 
technoscientific interventionists, rather than the inverse that Schwartz Cowan would 
later recommend. In light of Schwartz Cowan’s consumption junction framework, by 
categorizing 1970s social scientists of development according to the ways in which they 
arranged the epicenter and periphery of the technological diffusion network and from 
whose perspective they gazed upon the network, we can situate, if only by one system of 
coordinate reference, 1970s development-oriented social science in Mexico in the larger 
landscape of contemporaneous technoscience studies. 
Unlike the standard histories of the Green Revolution in Mexico and the case 
studies in economics presented in this thesis, the ethnographic studies of Clawson, 
Hoy, Gladwin, and DeWalt can be positioned in the larger landscape of technoscience 
studies by their configuration of the technological diffusion network with the consumer 
at the center and their critical approach to the diffusion of Green Revolution 
agricultural technologies from the epistemic perspective of campesinx farmers. In 
many ways their work can be seen to prefigure Schwartz Cowan’s consumption junction 
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framework. When Gladwin criticized the maximization (and other) assumptions and 
production functions of econometric modellers she was criticizing the algorithmic 
epistemic attitudes of Northern social scientists and their presuppositions about the 
universality of Northern consumer values. Her decision tree, though by no means an 
example of an epistemic practice of the Mexican campesinxs she studied, sought to 
build a model of agro-technological diffusion failure from the decision-making logics of 
her informants. Her iterative process of interrogating farmers’ decisions, crafting 
decision criteria from their answers, and testing those criteria against the testimony of 
other farmers, enabled her to evaluate Green Revolution technology adoption failure 
from the perspective of her campesinx informants. As Gladwin put it, her adoption 
decision model was “part of a larger attempt to view the Plan Puebla through the eyes 
of the proposed adopters of the new technology — the farmers.”115 This iterative process 
can be seen as an anachronistic application of Schwartz Cowan’s recommendation to 
“try to ascertain how the network may have looked when viewed from the inside out, 
which elements stood out as being more important, more determinative of choices than 
the others, and which paths seemed wise to pursue and which too dangerous to 
contemplate.”116 Gladwin’s decision tree flow chart was a model of Schwartz Cowan’s 
“paths”. 
Clawson and Hoy similarly prefigure of Schwartz Cowan’s consumption 
junction methodology. Their elucidation of six factors contributing to Nealticanos’ 
rejection of Green Revolution technologies is emblematic of Schwartz Cowan’s 
recommendation to view the network from the consumer’s point of view. Many of the 
reasons Nealticanos gave for rejecting the technoscientific intervention package not 
only were not considered in terms of econometric assumptions about campesinx 
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behavior, but the epistemic priorities underlying those six reasons were often 
antithetical to Northern conceptions of economic rationality and technological 
modernity. The aesthetic taste preferences of Nealticanos for certain varieties of maize 
were never considered by Rockefeller scientists, who designed the HYVs, as their name 
makes clear, for yield alone. Likewise, just to point to a second of many possible 
examples, the Nealticano need for excess maize stalk forage went uncomprehended by 
Rockefeller scientists and development agents. The dwarf stalks of Green Revolution 
cultivars were a keystone component of augmenting their yield (by allowing the 
fertilizer to contribute to the engorgement of the cob and preventing the consequently 
top heavy plants from toppling). According to the agricultural epistemology of the 
Nealticano farmer, and doubtless many other campesinx communities, the leftover 
maize stalk, rather than energetic waste, was an essential component of their 
community’s energetic life web when used to feed animals for meat and dairy through 
the winter. 
 DeWalt’s accusation of the ethnocentrism of the rhetoric of “modernization” 
and “development” was a critique from the perspective of the “to be modernized.” The 
“centrism” in the ethnocentrism he saw inherent in the agro-technological intervention 
of the Green Revolution can be read as the Northern technoscientific gaze from the 
center of the network of technological diffusion Schwartz Cowan argued against. 
DeWalt dispensed with the Northern dichotomy of modern and traditional; his 
informants twisted the “chain of being” put forth by development-oriented social 
scientists by adopting some of the Rockefeller recommended agricultural technologies, 
rejecting others in favor of extant indigenous alternatives, and hybridizing their new, 
supposedly contradictory, combinations of endogenous and exogenous technologies 
and techniques. DeWalt furthered these claims in later work on Temascalcingo by 
inverting the development categories of modern and traditional — he considered an 
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agricultural invention indigenous to Mexico to have the greatest “modernizing” effect 
on Temascalcingo — going further to center the Temascalcingan agro-technology 
“consumers” within the technological diffusion network. This rendered them both 
producer and consumer of their own agricultural technological knowledge and 
collapsed the technological diffusion network onto Temascalcingo itself, in effect 
purging Green Revolution interventionists from relevancy with regard to this particular 
locus of innovation. 
 Four years prior to the publication of his “Alternative Adaptive Strategies in a 
Mexican Ejido,” in 1975, before dispensing with the ethnocentrism of “modernization” 
and “development” in favor of “adaptation,” DeWalt dispensed with the notions of 
“peasant” conservatism and homogeneity, harkening back to the anthropological 
debate about the inherent qualities of “peasanthood.” In his “Inequalities in Wealth, 
Adoption of Technology, and Production in a Mexican Ejido,” DeWalt emphasized the 
value of intra-cultural diversity to add adaptability to externally-induced technological 
change. DeWalt used his emphasis on campesinx heterogeneity to challenge A.T. 
Mosher, E. Walter Coward, Wayne A. Schutjer, V.W. Ruttan and Yujiro Hayami’s 
insistence that socio-cultural institutional intervention was required for, and co-
productive of, successful technological intervention. DeWalt vociferously critiqued the 
“stereotyped descriptions of peasants” that were “very poorly relatable to the realities of 
individual communities” and that “led to a feeling that the most important changes 
which need to be made are in the values, attitudes, and motivations of the peasant 
(emphasis mine).”117 As evidenced in Benito and Moscardi & de Janvry, DeWalt 
believed that these stereotypes shifted the burden of the failure of agro-development 
programs onto the campesinxs and diverted attention away from institutional and 
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structural culpability. More damningly, DeWalt interviewed development agents in and 
around Temascalcingo who told him the campesinxs were resistant to change and 
uncomprehending of development goals; DeWalt considered the “‘scientific validation’ 
provided in the literature for the impressions and/or prejudices of the layman” to be 
unfortunate.118 Questioning the assumptions of those development agents, DeWalt 
found a case study demonstrating that Temascalcingan campesinxs were not resistant 
to change, but perhaps simply to the changes recommended by development agents 
unsuitable to their lifeways. They were quite eager to adopt an endogenous innovation 
that used local materials and local skilled labor, and that was conducive to their 
agricultural practices. 
The story of the sembradora is a fine example of Mexican campesinx intra-
cultural innovation. In Temascalcingo, as he had established in “Alternative Adaptive 
Strategies,” DeWalt found variations in Temascalcingan adoption of various subsets of 
the Green Revolution technological package. He also found that “the most significant 
‘modernization’ (apart from the flood control and irrigation works) in the region was 
not due to the introduction of Western agricultural technology. Instead it resulted from 
an apparently indigenous innovation of a new agricultural implement for planting 
corn” — the sembradora. The Temascalcingan campesinxs claimed the sembradora as 
their own invention. Although DeWalt questioned this, citing William Sanders, who 
had found a similar device in general use in the Teotihuancan Valley by the early 1950s. 
Whatever of its provenance within Mexico, the sembradora is an instance of intra-
cultural diversity and innovation.119 The most commonly used corn planting implement 
at the time was the pala, or digging stick, which functioned exactly as it sounds, and 
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which the Temascalcingan campesinxs estimated required 10-18 person-days to plant 
one hectare of    corn.120 The agro-development agents’ solution was for campesinxs to 
take out loans or form collectives to buy or rent tractors. The farmers who were studied 
had an historical reticence about forming collectives; such efforts had repeatedly failed, 
and at great cost to the smallholder farmers, due to fraud, corruption, and inequitable 
work loads and proceeds allocation.121 Setting aside the efficacy of collectivism, the 
campesinxs had reservations about the superiority of the tractor for planting corn, and 
not because of any inherent suspicion of mechanization or nostalgia about manual 
labor — in 1973, 34 percent of Temascalcingan farmers rented tractors to plow their 
fields — but instead because they had tried the tractor and found it unsuitable for 
planting. Small holdings in Mexico, and especially those that were part of ejidos, were 
often irregularly-shaped discontinuous plots that made the use of the tractor 
cumbersome. This did not prevent them from using tractors to plow but planting 
required more precision and the tractors, and the planting attachments they pulled, 
were instead designed for larger, flatter, and more orthogonal topography (as found in 
the American Midwest and Great Plains). When they experimented with tractors, 
Temascalcingan farmers reported that they regularly had to reseed by hand anyway, 
increasing labor costs that, when coupled with the already prohibitive cost of tractor 
rental, rendered this technique unfeasible. 
 There were other alternatives that combined the precision control of the pala 
and the labor-saving of the tractor in use before the sembradora gained widespread 
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acceptance. One involved using a wooden plow to create a furrow, drop the seeds in, 
and cover the seeds with the recently excavated dirt using one’s foot; the other involved 
creating a furrow with a steel plow, displacing the dirt to one side, dropping the seeds 
in and covering them by throwing the displaced dirt back into the furrow with the next 
pass of the plow. While these were both labor-saving relative to the pala, they failed to 
plant the seeds at the appropriate depth, resulting in a successful sprouting only if the 
spring rains came early, otherwise they planted the seed too shallowly to reach the 
moisture deeper in the subsoil. The innovation was to remove the moldboard (the part 
the pushes the churned soil off to one side), increase the angle of attack of the share 
(the part that knifes through the soil) to deepen the cut, and to attach a tube along the 
plow shaft through which a second operator deposited seeds periodically. The tube was 
originally constructed from the leaves of the maguey, a species of agave, although it 
was eventually formed from metal and welded to the shaft.122 
 
Farmers could also adjust the depth by varying the pressure on the plow handle, 
“especially important when there are significant microdifferenes in soil composition 
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within small areas.”123 As modifications were made to switch from maguey leaves to 
metal tubing, enhance the durability of the frame, and alter the angle of attack of the 
share, Temascalcingan farmers turned to their local blacksmith to implement their 
trial-tested recommendations. Roughly half of DeWalt’s informants began using the 
sembradora between 1957 and 1967; by 1973 only one of the 146 people with land rights 
in the village was not using the sembradora (they used a tractor). Also by 1973, that 
local blacksmith was manufacturing over 200 sembradoras a year, limited only by how 
quickly he could produce them, not by demand. He said that customers had come from 
more than 50 miles away to purchase the sembradora, and his only fear was that one of 
the large plow manufacturers in nearby Monterey would begin producing them, as he 
could not afford the 100,000 pesos necessary to purchase the metal stamping machine 
he would need to compete. 
 The sembradora represented for DeWalt an “appropriate technology.” It used 
local materials, local manufacturing, was powered by renewable sources, was 
inexpensive to manufacture and maintain, and reduced the person-days required to 
plant from 10-18 to two. The lesson of the sembradora was clear to DeWalt: 
“[t]ransplanting Western technology to a developing country may not be the best, and 
certainly is not the only, road to modernization.”124 The anthropological field studies 
between 1975 and 1979 demonstrated an awareness of the colonialist implications of 
their work and the larger development enterprise they studied. They also questioned 
the dichotomy of “peasant” traditionalism and innovativeness, highlighted the 
ethnocentrism of “modernization” and “development” enterprises, and inverted 
ethnocentric models of peasant choice that had previously centered the locus of agency 
onto Northern technoscience producers and the locus of blame onto Mexican 
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campesinx consumers. Depending on their professional associations, Clawson, Hoy, 
Gladwin, and DeWalt also began to question not merely the methods of the Green 
Revolution intervention in Mexico but the development enterprise itself. This trajectory 
of scholarship critical of development methods and the foundational principles of the 
development endeavor played out simultaneously in the anthropological overviews of 
the Green Revolution. Detached from their commitment to ethnography and the limits 
of that genre, many of these anthropologists extended these critiques in radical ways. 
Interpretations of the Green Revolution in Mexico: Anthropology 
 Some of these anthropologists, like Clawson, Hoy, and DeWalt above, were 
unattached to any development agency. Others, like Gladwin above, were employed by 
a development agency and sought to critically address the coloniality of development-
oriented social science from within the development apparatus. Susan W. Almy, to take 
a milder example, was a development anthropologist working for the Rockefeller 
Foundation when she in no uncertain terms acknowledged that “[s]ocial scientists — 
and especially anthropologists — are typically hired by one group (or patron) to exercise 
their skills on another group the patron considers hostile or inferior.”125 This comes as a 
surprise because her article, “Anthropologists and Development Agencies” was a 
protracted plea to encourage more anthropologists to work in those agencies. She also 
made sure to point out that anthropologists were an important component of British 
colonial administration “during the period of expanding empire,” and that “anticolonial 
sentiment” in the South was one of the forces driving anthropologists back to academia 
and away from Southern development projects.126 
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 More commonly, critiques came from outside the development enterprise. 
Larissa Lomnitz, for her part, insisted that “[e]verywhere in Latin America 
anthropologists have been directly or indirectly members of the central state apparatus 
. . .,” and she refers directly to the complex colonial situation in Mexico. Pointing to 
President Lazaro Cardenas’s 1940 Indian Policy (which, in Cardenas’s words, was “‘not 
concerned with keeping the Indians as Indians, or with indianizing Mexico, but rather 
with mexicanizing the Indians’”), she observed that the colonization of Mexico’s 
indigenous population could as likely come from their own federal government, majorly 
staffed with Mexicans of preponderant Spanish ancestry, or who presented as such, as 
it could from European or American interference.127 She, too, connected anthropology 
to the intellectual lineage of colonialism, reminding us that the first ethnographers in 
Latin American were Spanish soldiers and priests attempting to convert the indigenous 
population.128 Frank C. Miller, an anthropologist at the University of Minnesota, 
mincing no words and wasting no time in an article drawing on Vine Deloria added: “In 
distant lands we have been accused of academic imperialism: it is said that we mine the 
colonies for data and take the profits home, contributing nothing to the welfare of the 
people who have furnished that data,” in order to reverse this legacy, Miller advocated 
for “a new willingness [by anthropologists] to examine our assymetrical [sic] 
relationship with the subjects of our research and a new determination to seek ways to 
redress the balance.”129Almy, Lomnitz, and Miller did more than urge caution about the 
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colonialist implications of the anthropological endeavor in their theorizing about the 
relationship between anthropologists, power, and development programs. 
Almy, Lomnitz, and Miller also brought these broader questions of academic 
colonialism to bear on the Green Revolution in Mexico. Miller bemoaned the absence of 
anthropological focus on the Green Revolution and to urged others to remedy it. His 
“Knowledge and Power: Anthropology, Policy Research, and the Green Revolution,” 
assessed Green Revolution technologies and institutional frameworks in order to use 
the Green Revolution “as a vehicle for addressing some fundamental issues about the 
role of technology in social change and about the role of anthropologists in policy 
research.”130 He did so by first problematizing the 1970 Nobel Peace Prize award to 
Norman Borlaug, plant geneticist and head of the wheat program for Rockefeller in 
Mexico, and the scientific triumphalism characteristic of popular perceptions of the 
Green Revolution at that time. One of the euphoric promises of Green Revolution 
development agents, because their technologies were primarily biological and chemical 
rather than mechanical, was that those technologies would be neutral with regard to 
scale, that is, they would be just as effective on small plots for small farmers as for 
industrial-scale farmers. On this point, Miller, citing Keith Griffin, an economist at 
Oxford, argued that though the technologies were scale-neutral, their managing 
institutions were not: with extension agencies targeting large farmers, creditors 
preferencing low-risk borrowers with collateral, and synthetic input retailers marketing 
to those able to buy in bulk. Griffin noted that innovation will “always” favor the 
prosperous and secure.131 
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Here Miller, like the economist Burke, entered into a major concern of science 
and technology studies. Can we extricate technology from the social causes and 
consequences of its implementation? Must we assume the neutrality of the 
technological object and ensure the equality of opportunity inherent in that object and 
conversely assume any inequalities must be the liability of the individuals or 
institutions responsible for the implementation of that technology? Is it possible that a 
technological object itself, or a scientific precept, be imbued with the sticky social 
residues of human fallibility? The social scientists I discussed in the case studies had a 
difficult time grappling with this possibility: they proposed alternative implementation 
protocols, alternative design processes for the technologies, or different combinations 
of technologies rather than consider that the technology itself could be accentuating 
socioeconomic inequality. They always blackboxed the technological object foisted on 
Mexican campesinxs and only concerned themselves with every ancillary element of 
technological intervention. 
 In his recommendations to anthropologists to study the Green Revolution, 
however, Miller did not shy away from the technological object, although he understood 
that some anthropologists, lacking technical expertise, may have felt uncomfortable 
and unqualified assessing such a massive technological package. What he was in 
essence urging was the application of ethnographic expertise to agronomic scientist and 
engineer working groups: an anthropology of technoscientific production that would at 
least begin to redress Deloria’s charge of anthropological imperialism. He provided four 
questions for anthropologists working on the Green Revolution: “What are the intrinsic 
attributes of the new technology? What can it do, and how is it superior to the old? 
What new constraints are associated with these attributes? Who controls the 
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application of the technology, and for whose benefit?”132 In Miller’s scheme the 
technological object itself would no longer be the exclusive purview of technologists, 
and no longer immune from the critical gaze of anthropologists investigating a 
development program. For Miller, addressing these questions required a 
multidisciplinary effort by both agronomic scientists/technologists and social scientists. 
This kind of collaboration was essential to what Miller saw as the critical disjuncture 
between the quantitative purview of agronomists and the “merely” qualitative purview 
of anthropologists. Against Acheson’s preference for quantifiable econometric 
variables, Miller, if a bit dramatically, contended that “just as quantification is not an 
invention of the Devil to encourage intellectual sloth, neither is it the golden road to 
salvation.”133 Miller recognized that, on the one hand, “[t]he ecological effects of 
pesticides are important whether or not they are recognized in the world-view of the 
local cultures. On the other hand, local people may perceive costs and benefits that are 
not understood by outside technicians and planners.” He was arguing that costs and 
benefits should be understood from both an etic and an emic view (reiterating Kunkel’s 
recommendation above), and with consideration of both quantitative and qualitative 
factors, making a compelling argument for the value of technoscientific and social-
scientific cooperation.134 In the same way that Green Revolution studies prefigured 
Schwartz Cowan’s consumption junction framework from the early 1980s, Miller’s 1977 
proposal for an anthropology of technology mirrored the current social construvtivist 
fermentation in the then nascent Science and Technology Studies (STS). It would be 
interesting to see if Miller’s suggestion that sociologists and anthropologists of 
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technology should collaborate with engineers and other technologists was likewise 
considered in STS journals at that time. 
Susan W. Almy devoted her “Anthropologists and Development Agencies” to 
that very suggestion, although with the specific condition that more anthropologists 
should seek not just to cooperate with agronomists, but to do so in the employ of 
development agencies and NGOs. At the time of its publication Almy was working as a 
socio-economist/anthropologist for the Rockefeller Foundation. Almy, too, saw the 
potential for social-scientists to work with physical scientists in technological 
interventions, although she believed that social-scientists were too often deployed to 
“modify organizational environments” — specifically the host socio-cultural and 
political institutions — either to facilitate the more effective use of a technology or to 
mollify its negative effects. What was needed instead, she argued, was for 
anthropologists to work with physical scientists with the goal of building their socio-
cultural expertise directly into the technology or technique from the start.135 As did 
Miller, Almy held that technological objects and techniques are not isolated from their 
social causes and consequences. It was not just institutional and campesinx targets of 
the technoscientific package that should be subject to social-scientist participation but 
the design and development of the technoscientific package itself. 
Almy also brought to the fore an understandable suspicion of her anthropologist 
colleagues who “justify their work by the contradiction that their sciences are too 
imperfect for them to develop the degree of control and prediction toward which they 
aim.”136 In a development agency their employer would actually attempt to enact that 
degree of control using their “imperfect” science. Underneath this justification was the 
assumption of the superior epistemic status of more exact sciences. The 
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anthropologists’ fear of being in an agency [where] “the immediate likelihood of a 
theory’s implementation is increased, and with it a sense of contradiction and level of 
tension,” could excuse them from cooperating with development programs. Almy’s 
evaluation upheld the epistemic hierarchy where qualitative social science was lower in 
status than sciences construed as “hard” or “exact,” but nonetheless introduced a 
destabilizing possibility: that anthropologists could act from a position of power within 
an operative agency, rather than from an adversarial position outside it. 
 Larissa Lomnitz, in her “Anthropology and Development in Latin America” had 
no such qualms about social scientists adopting an adversarial anthropological attitude 
to modernization. Rather than reform the development enterprise by recommending 
changes to the specifics of its implementation, Lomnitz articulated a vision of Latin 
American anthropology committed to a path of Latin American evolution free from 
Northern epistemic intervention. In 1979, she described the current state of affairs in 
Latin American anthropology as one in which 
[a]nthropologists themselves became critical of their involvement in 
modernization. The disenchantment spread to the political arena. Politicians and 
agency officials began complaining that social scientists were ineffectual, tended 
to shy away from making specific recommendations, and merely criticized the 
existing state of affairs without offering constructive solutions.137 
 
Although she stated that “[t]he critique of Latin American anthropology became 
radicalized” with the passive voice, she was one of the anthropologists helping to 
radicalize it. Originally attempting to use the Northern epistemic mode on her study 
communities, she instead acquired the “internal rationality” of those whom she 
studied:  
The revulsion against development [by Latin American anthropologists], 
originating in the Marxist camp, was joined by critiques of another sort. 
Anthropologists were trained to gather information on other cultures through 
participant observation, implying close personal contact with alien ways of life. 
As anyone who has done fieldwork knows, the internal rationality of the studied 
                                                          
137 Lomnitz, “Anthropology and Development in Latin America,” 315. 
83 
 
communities has a way of growing on the anthropologist, until he is no longer 
certain whether the changes he is supposed to promote are worthwhile. External 
ideological notions of development (including those justifying his presence in the 
village) may look increasingly irrelevant. This attitude of the anthropologist is 
bound to irritate his employers and those academic critics who would merely 
trade the present blueprint of development for a different one.138 
 
The effect that the “internal rationality” of study subjects had on hers and other 
anthropologists’ attitudes toward modernization should be read as epistemic anti-
colonial resistance. 
Lomnitz herself, a Chilean-Mexican anthropologist trained in Mexico, here 
positioned herself in direct conflict with technoscientific development, and like the 
anthropologists she described who had been influenced by the internal rationality of 
indigenous Mexico, she insisted that cultural evolution is multilineal rather than 
unilineal — a cosmological precept antithetical to the monolithic Northern dictum of 
“Development”: “industrialize!”. Lomnitz undercut this core tenet of the technoscience-
facilitated capitalist worldview when she posed this question: “It now seems doubtful 
that we in Latin America shall ever attain the levels of industrial and technological 
development found in Europe, the United States or Japan. Why insist on pursuing 
objectives which may be unrealistic, as well as unsatisfactory in terms of our own 
cultures?”139 In answer to this question she called for solutions that “are less simplistic 
and destructive” and that: 
presuppose a basic respect for the capability of human societies to formulate 
valid designs for their own survival. There are many alternative roads toward 
development — if ‘development’ is understood as a more harmonious, peaceful, 
and productive pattern of life in a community. By utilizing local resources, local 
forms of production, and local social organizations, we may tap the specific 
contribution of each society to the pool of human experience.140 
 
Because “[p]revious models of development have been based largely on the goal of 
incorporating traditional populations into an industrial, consumer society,” Lomnitz 
challenged anthropologists to “shift the emphasis of development towards autonomy, 
self-sufficiency, and creativity at the community level.”141 The sembradora planting 
implement DeWalt described was one such example of a self-sufficient creativity at the 
community level that, in Lomnitz’s words, used local resources, forms of production, 
                                                          
138 Lomnitz, “Anthropology and Development in Latin America,” 316. 
139 Lomnitz, “Anthropology and Development in Latin America,” 316. 
140 Lomnitz, “Anthropology and Development in Latin America,” 316. 
141 Lomnitz, “Anthropology and Development in Latin America,” 316. 
84 
 
and social organization. The sembradora was both developed as a reaction against the 
local unsuitability of an artifact of the Green Revolution intervention for planting — the 
tractor — and, according to Lomnitz vision for an alternative Latin American 
development, counteracted the Green Revolution intervention and restored campesinx 
Mexican agricultural epistemologies. 
 Lomnitz’s critique was not unheard of for the exception it took to the very 
notion of “development” as a euphemistic metonym for Northern style 
industrialization. Although there were other more radical critiques, Gladwin’s, 
Clawson’s, Hoy’s, and DeWalt’s field studies generally reflected Miller’s, Almy’s, and 
Lomnitz’s caution about the colonialist implications of development-oriented 
anthropology and sought to remedy the information asymmetries between 
anthropologists and their informants that Deloria so astutely identified.142 Clawson’s, 
Hoy’s, Gladwin’s, and DeWalt’s ethnographic field studies and Almy’s, Miller’s, and 
Lomnitz’s distant anthropological assessments of the Green Revolution traced a 
remarkable trajectory in social scientific attitudes to the Green Revolution in particular 
and to the development enterprise in principle. As the 1970s waned, reformist critiques 
of Green Revolution methods that could be plugged back into the next iteration of the 
technoscientific intervention gave way to foundational critiques of the imposed 
“modernization” of Northern technoscience, liberal-democratic government, and global 
capitalism. 
These tripartite co-productive forces of the Rockefeller-led and Mexican 
government-supported American intervention in Mexican agricultural knowledge-
making that economists, and some anthropologists, initially made possible became, by 
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the end of the decade, the very object of social scientific critiques. In this way, the 
Green Revolution underwent an inversion from being the implementation of 
modernization theory par excellence to being an instigator and indicator of a crisis in 
modernization theory. Interestingly, segments of the social scientific community — 
mostly economists and sociologists of development — originally envisioned the Green 
Revolution as the model of applied modernization theory and segments of the social 
scientific community — mostly anthropologists in close contact with Mexican 
communities — eventually identified it as representative of the fundamental flaws of 
modernization theory. As the social scientific process played out in contact with the 
Green Revolution and moved closer to the consumption junction, and as social 
scientists studied the epistemologies of their informants from the perspective of those 
campesinx farmers, as Schwartz Cowan would in a few years recommend, social 
scientific work on Mexican agriculture was transformed from a complementary source 
of epistemic colonialism to a potent source of epistemic anti-colonialism. 
 
Conclusions/Extensions 
The technoscientific intervention of the Green Revolution was built upon the 
theoretical foundation of modernization theory developed by social scientists, itself 
built upon social scientific conceptions of “peasant” attitudes. Green Revolution social 
science — econometric and other behavioral models — were tested on the Green 
Revolution’s technoscientific packages. The combined technoscientific and social 
scientific interventions constituted a sociotechnical intervention that, coupled with 
American Cold War pseudo-territorialization and Mexican national identity formation 
with which it was co-productive, constituted a development regime. This development 
regime worked to supplant indigenous Mexican epistemologies, homogenize Mexican 
86 
 
ethnolinguistic identity, and incorporate Mexico into a liberal-democratic Cold War 
capitalist bloc. 
Models were made of campesinx microeconomic decision-making behavior, but 
also of the development regime in Mexico itself. Mexico was not only the place where 
maize and wheat cultivars were hybridized and genetically acclimatized to the target 
nation, but the place where the Northern epistemology and its auxiliary institutions 
were acclimatized to a Southern social, political, and educational culture. It was a 
model of epistemic colonialism, the variables of which could be tweaked for any other 
target nation or community, deployed, refined through social scientific analysis, and 
reiterated. The Green Revolution development regime in Mexico, in general, resulted in 
the enrichment of a small well-propertied class and the further impoverishment, labor 
alienation, land expropriation, and displacement of a much larger and often often 
ethnically indigenous class. These results, lifting the veil of technoscience’s value-
neutrality and political disinterest, allow historians to view the Green Revolution 
development regime through the stereoscopic lenses of colonial and post-colonial 
historical frameworks. 
The development-oriented social scientists in this period also prefigured 
important theoretical developments in the history and sociology of technoscientific 
knowledge. They insisted upon the interdependent necessity of technoscientific and 
socio-political institutional interventions before the idiom of co-production was 
articulated. They also challenged the neutrality and the asocial status of the 
technological object and analytically enmeshed it in political and cultural networks of 
social relations. Finally, they refined their analyses of technological intervention over 
the course of the 1970s by situating their research ever closer to the consumption 
junction and reorienting their critical gaze, and sometimes even their ideological 
affiliations, to be more in line with the perspective of the consumer. But what does 
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“technological consumer” mean in the context of agriculture? In Schwartz Cowan’s 
work, upon which the consumption junction methodology was built, the consumers of 
household appliances for heating and cooking were also the beneficiaries of the utility 
those technologies provided. In subsistence agriculture, the farming family is the 
recipient of the benefits of improvement in agricultural practices and tools, however 
improvement is defined by that family according to its needs and values. But the aim of 
the Green Revolution was the end of subsistence farming in favor of cash cropping 
(even if the crops were staple grains). The goal was integrate Mexican campesinx 
farmers into the domestic grain market, produce a surplus beyond their subsistence 
needs, and use the proceeds to participate in the domestic consumer marketplace. This 
goal was repeated at the international national scale, where Mexico hoped to become a 
net exporter of grain and participate in international exchange with an import/export 
balance advantage. In this scheme, the campesinx farmer, in this sense, is still the 
recipient of the utility of technological changes, but the campesinxs’ conception of 
utility — from the value of nourishment and family provision under subsistence 
farming to the value consumer goods under cash cropping — must change in order to 
experience the utility benefits of the technological change. In this scheme, then, the 
technological artifact contributes to the alienation of the farmer from the products of 
their labor. How does this relocation of the site of consumption and the sudden 
reconfiguration of an artifact’s utility to the farmer affect analytical approaches in the 
sociology and history of agricultural technology? 
 This thesis also closely skirts a carefully-guarded barrier in historical practice. 
Its primary source material is clustered up against the year 1979. One of the 
methodological approaches it employs was first articulated in 1983. I have suggested 
that, almost certainly unbeknownst to Schwartz Cowan, many of the practices she 
recommended to sociologists of technology arose independently out the experiences of 
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social scientists in the Green Revolution; I even suggest that the genesis of those 
approaches in Green Revolution Mexico — the inversion of the technological diffusion 
network, the centering of the consumer, the adoption of the consumer’s gaze back over 
the network — was born out of an opposite attempt to understand and optimize the 
network according the the producer’s priorities. The point here is not a silly priority 
claim about the rightful origins of the consumption junction methodology, but instead 
to examine the muddled intersection of social scientific and humanistic practice in the 
messy interdisciplinarity of Science and Technology Studies. The retrospective focal 
length historians need in order to achieve adequate distance from the subject of their 
inquiry can become impinged upon when they, through their cozy interdisciplinary 
relationship with the sociology of technoscience, borrow methodologies that were 
meant to be used by their subjects, not on them. 
Another shortcoming of this thesis is the attention I failed to give the 
“artifacticity” of agricultural knowledge. This thesis is, in this sense, too much an 
intellectual history where it could have also and more productively been a material-
cultural history of Green Revolution epistemic colonialism. Unfortunately, I, too, was 
inculcated in the Northern mode of knowledge production. As a knowledge-embedded 
material object, the hybrid seed that was recommended to Mexican campesinxs 
alienated them from their local cultivars’ germplasm whose genetic lines they have 
sculpted for centuries. If knowledge is to be found in practices and objects as much as 
in brains, the displacement of campesinx agricultural techniques and long-husbanded 
genetic material constituted a knowledge erasure. With the exception of technically- 
and financially-intensive climate-controlled seed storage, campesinx botanical genetic 
heritage, unlike paper reservoirs of knowledge, must be planted and propagated or will 
perish; campesinx agricultural techniques likewise must be practiced to be preserved. 
These shortcomings in this thesis bear an ironic resemblance to the shortcomings of 
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the Green Revolution technoscientific packages: a program that was purported to 
transcend scarcity but instead replaced an agroecological system sustained over the 
course of centuries that used local materials with a technoscientific system with 
implements made from non-renewable metallic and petroleum-based materials and 
fueled by non-renewable fuels, using inputs the production and use of which is a 
significant source of air and water pollution and biodiversity reduction, and with seeds 
that cannot reproduce with one another. 
And why do biomimetic metaphors keep cropping up? Shiva’s “monoculture of 
the mind”, DeWalt’s “adaptive strategies”, and De Sousa Santos et al.’s “ecology of 
knowledges”. Rural farming cultures are socioecological systems. Mechanistic 
reductivity is inadequate to the task of describing them, and so we find ourselves 
turning to metaphors built from complex organic phenomena. While this thesis posits 
an argument, it works much harder as a prospectus for future, more rigorous work 
analyzing the relationships among agricultural intervention in Mexico; the co-
production of technoscience and state in the Cold War; the impossibility of separating 
science and technology in agricultural research (or prioritizing one above the other); 
the conflict between the causal linearity and compartmentalization of mechanistic 
reduction and the messy circularity and complex interdependence of organic 
phenomena like agroecology and rural communities; and the erasure of the 
agroecological knowledge of those rural communities by Northern technoscience’s 
claims to universality and lawful causality.  
Epilogue 
“In general, though, among the ejidatarios themselves, corn is not seen as a viable cash 
crop. Repeatedly I was told by informants that ‘maiz no es negocio’ (‘corn is not 
business’).”143 
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 Edwin J. Wellhausen, a native of Fairfax, Oklahoma, was part of the original 
team sent by the Rockefeller Foundation to help found the Mexican Agricultural 
Program (MAP). He was one of the first development agents of the Green Revolution. 
After a decade as head of the corn breeding program, he succeeded George J. Harrar as 
the director of MAP. When CIMMYT was established and MAP dissolved, Wellhausen 
became its first Director General. In a documentary produced by CIMMYT commonly 
known as Harvest, Wellhausen had this to say about the interaction between 
Rockefeller agents and local farmers based on an experience he had shortly after his 
arrival in Mexico: 
First came down here in 1943, I thought I knew all about growing corn. I was 
fresh from the state of Iowa where I suppose more corn is grown than any place 
in the world in the same size area. I wanted to speed up things, so I went into the 
state of Morelos, rented some land, and started to work. And we took a tractor 
and other pieces of farm implements along with us to prepare the land in order 
to get moisture into the soil while we irrigated it. We furrowed it out and we 
planted our seed in these furrows. As we dropped each seed we covered each seed 
by shoving dirt on top of it with our feet. This left a nice loose cover of soil, left it 
in a condition which I thought was ideal for germinating. A number of times while 
we were doing this a man that did all the work around there he came by and he 
kept saying well you can’t plant corn this way and I said what do you mean you 
can’t plant corn this way. He says it won’t grow. Well you know we waited about 
ten days and only one plant here and there separated by as much as 10, 20 feet 
appeared in the whole field that we planted. And he came back when I was 
looking over the field and shook his head. He said, let me show you how to plant 
this stuff so I said alright. I’m gonna plant the seed that I have left just exactly 
like you tell me how to do it. So what did he do? He got out his team of oxen. We 
went over to an adjacent piece of land and started to work. First thing he did was 
made a furrow with this old egyptian plow. Made a furrow about 3 inches 4 inches 
deep and about 3 inches wide, something like that. And he put the seed in that 
furrow. Then he came along and made another furrow right along the side of it, 
close enough to where as he went along, the dirt from his egyptian plow pushed 
over or fell over onto the seed we had planted. Now he said we’ll run water down 
this furrow I made. Okay we planted the whole field in this fashion. Ten days later 
it had a perfect stand. Every grain in that field came up just as beautiful as could 
be. I said what’s the trouble here? Why didn’t my method work? I scratched 
around in the soil and I found that all the seeds that didn’t germinate, which were 
99% of them had been destroyed by insects in the area that had crawled through 
this loose soil, gotten to the seed as it swelled, as it began to germinate, and ate 
the germa. Now the method that he used prevented the insects from getting down 
to the seed because by irrigating after the seed was planted, the water melded 
down the clods and closed up all the space between the top of the soil and the 
seed and the insects didn’t get down there and the stuff germinated and came up 
fine. I learned quickly that in a new area, that is, an area I knew little or nothing 
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about, it is better to follow the systems or methods the farmers used in that area. 
In other words what I’m trying to say is that in technical assistance it is very 
important to first learn why the farmer does what he does. Once having learned 
this it is possible to make very slight changes and through these very slight 
changes to make tremendous advances, or gains, in production.144  
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